John Paul Stevens

“ If an officer effects an arrest by touching a citizen, apparently the Court would accept the fact that a seizure occurred, even if the arrestee should thereafter break loose and flee. In such a case, the constitutionality of the seizure would be evaluated as of the time the officer acted. That category of seizures would then be analyzed in the same way as searches, namely, was the police action justified when it took place? It is anomalous, at best, to fashion a different rule for the subcategory of "show of force" arrests. ”

“ What has evolved from our cases is a determination that an initially consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen can be transformed into a seizure or detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' Mendenhall, supra, [446 U.S.] at 554 [100 S.Ct. at 1877] (footnote omitted) ”

“ Given the fact that street encounters between citizens and police officers "are incredibly rich in diversity," Terry, 392 U.S., at 13, 88 S.Ct., at 1875, the Court recognized the need for flexibility and held that "reasonable" suspicion-a quantum of proof less demanding than probable cause-was adequate to justify a stop for investigatory purposes. ”

“ Today's qualification of the Fourth Amendment means that innocent citizens may remain "secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures" only at the discretion of the police. [20]
" [A] n illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. ”

“ Even though momentary, a seizure occurs whenever an objective evaluation of a police officer's show of force conveys the message that the citizen is not entirely free to leave-in other words, that his or her liberty is being restrained in a significant way. That the Court understood the Mendenhall definition as both necessary and sufficient to describe a Fourth Amendment seizure is evident from this passage in our opinion in United States v. ”

“ Ohio, 392 U.S., at 16, 88 S.Ct., at 1877.↑ Justice Jackson presaged this development when he wrote:↑ " [T] he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court. . . . There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear." ”

“ The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (dissenting opinion) .
Some sacrifice of freedom always accompanies an expansion in the executive's unreviewable [21] law enforcement powers. A court more sensitive to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment would insist on greater rewards to society before decreeing the sacrifice it makes today. ”

“ In cases within this new subcategory, there will be a period of time during which the citizen's liberty has been restrained, but he or she has not yet completely submitted to the show of force. A motorist pulled over by a highway patrol car cannot come to an immediate stop, even if the motorist intends to obey the patrol car's signal. If an officer decides to make the kind of random stop forbidden by Delaware v. ”

“ The distinction between the actual case and the hypothetical case is the same as the distinction between the common-law torts of assault and battery-a touching converts the former into the latter. [6] Although the distinction between assault and battery was important for pleading purposes, see 2 J. Chitty, Pleading *372-*376, the distinction should not take on constitutional dimensions. ”

“ Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ) ; see Mendenhall, 446 U.S., at 553-554, 100 S.Ct., at 1876-1877 (same) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 12, 88 S.Ct., at 1875 ("Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct") ; 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (j) , pp. ”