Summary

Louis May Greeley What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce… (1887)

NO class of cases are more perplexing than those involving the distinction between the power of Congress to regulate foreign or interstate commerce and the so-called police power of the States. It has always been conceded that there were many kinds of laws, such as quarantine laws, health laws, etc., operating upon foreign or interstate commerce, which were within the power of the States. How are such laws to be distinguished on principle from regulations of foreign or interstate commerce within the exclusive power of Congress?
Source: Wikisource

Louis May Greeley What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce… (1887)

Of this additional burden, interstate freight and passenger traffic would have to bear its proportionate part. Then, why not argue that the right to impose such a burden upon interstate traffic implied the power to prohibit such traffic.
The weakness in this argument is that it fails to recognize that the purpose of a law is to be considered and taken into account. Because a State may tax objects of interstate commerce for purposes of revenue, it by no means follows that it may tax them for the express purpose of excluding their admission into the State.
Source: Wikisource

Louis May Greeley What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce… (1887)

It is unreasonable to suppose that Chief-Justice Marshall would have decided in favor of the concurrency of the commercial power of Congress, without one word of comment upon the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, or that Johnson, J., would have joined in the opinion, had he supposed it so to decide. There is certainly no language in the opinion which expressly lays down the doctrine that the congressional commercial power is concurrent, wholly or in part.
Source: Wikisource

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