“ The words of the Constitution were chosen, not to make it hard to prove merely routine and everyday acts, but to make the proof of acts that convict of treason as sure as trial processes may. When the prosecution's case is thus established, the Constitution does not prevent presentation of corroborative or cumulative evidence of any admissible character either to strengthen a direct case or to rebut the testimony or inferences on behalf of defendant. The Government is not prevented from making a strong case; it is denied a conviction on a weak one. ”
Robert H. Jackson
Summary
This legal opinion by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, likely from a dissent or court case involving defendant Cramer and figures such as Thiel and Kerling, analyzes the constitutional standards for establishing treason, with emphasis on intent, visible actions, and the acceptability of indirect evidence.
Against the background of jurisdictional conflicts and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the text addresses the balance between the need for solid proof of disloyalty and the safeguarding of individual rights, stressing that treason necessitates both tangible support for an enemy and clear evidence of intent to betray the United States. The piece highlights the difficulty of deducing betrayal from behavior, especially when visible actions are unclear or not concealed, as illustrated by the case's disputed evidence and legal precedents.
Quotes from .. (Robert H. Jackson)
“ Since intent must be inferred from conduct of some sort, we think it is permissible to draw usual reasonable inferences as to intent from the overt acts. The law of treason, like the law of lesser crimes, assumes every man to intend the natural consequences which one standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge would reasonably expect to result from his acts. Proof that a citizen did give aid and comfort to an enemy may well be in the circumstances sufficient evidence that he adhered to that enemy and intended and purposed to strike at his own country. ”
“ It is our purpose scrupulously to observe the long standing rule that we will not review a judgment of a state court that rests on an adequate and independent ground in state law. Nor will we review one until the fact that it does not do so appears of record. But because we will not proceed with a review while our jurisdiction is conjectural it does not follow that we should not take steps to protect our jurisdiction when we are given reasonable grounds to believe it exists. ”
