Summary

Robert Taylor v. John Thompson Mason…

It is impossible to contend, that those so taking by inheritance, should be regarded as purchasers, or that, with them, this should be considered as a condition precedent: and why should not the same construction of the testator's intention, that must be given with respect to them, be given in the first instance, where the same proviso is used, viz. that it is a conditional limitation, on the refusal to perform which, the antecedent estate is defeated, and a new one arises? Unquestionably the limitation, on refusal to comply, is a conditional limitation.
Source: Wikisource

Robert Taylor v. John Thompson Mason…

That the words in this will, 'the male heir of my nephew, John Thompson Mason, lawfully begotten, for ever,' as explained and modified by the subsequent expressions, designate the 'male heir of the body of J. T. Mason,' as the person who is to take the estate, and thus operate as a 'descriptio personae,' and not as a 'limitation.' Consequently, that they do not create such an estate of inheritance, as is capable of uniting with a life estate, under the rule; but must operate, if at all, as a devise, per se, of an estate in possession or remainder, or as an executory devise.
Source: Wikisource

Robert Taylor v. John Thompson Mason…

But is must, like other equally strong expressions, bend to the testator's general intent, and to the words 'who has the right.' How 'has the right,' if obtaining an act of the legislature and changing the name after twenty-one, be a condition precedent? For then no estate can vest, and no right be had, till the condition be performed. So it is said, the will shows the right is not to commence till he has arrived at twenty-one. But the age of twenty-one connects itself, both in sense and grammar, with the act to be done, and not with the vesting of the right.
Source: Wikisource

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