Summary

Samuel Nelson The Plymouth — Opinion of the Court

Can a reason be assigned why the jurisdiction of the American admiralty should not be as broad and beneficial as that of any system of cultivated justice? We are not bound in fetters, by the constitution, to the English rule. If we breack the constitution by departing from the English rule, we have already broken it into atoms. We broke it when we suffered the jurisdiction to penetrate into the body of a county. So we broke it when the limit of tide-water was discarded, with the sovereign arbitrament of the moon. And we broke it again, when admiralty jurisdiction was applied to revenue cases.
Source: Wikisource

Samuel Nelson The Plymouth — Opinion of the Court

We can give, therefore, no particular weight or influence to the consideration that the injury in the present case originated from the negligence of the servants of the respondents on board of a vessel, except as evidence that it originated on navigable waters-the Chicago River; and, as we have seen, the simple fact that it originated there, but, the whole damage done upon land, the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. The negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action
Source: Wikisource

Samuel Nelson The Plymouth — Opinion of the Court

Let the court consider the nature and characteristics of the two things concerned in the case of damage,-the object injured, and the agent causing the injury.
I. The object, or part of the object, injured-the wharf-was unquestionably a maritime thing. A wharf is the necessary terminus, a quo and ad quem, of every voyage, in certain lines of trade; and becomes thus indispensable to commerce and navigation. It is an instrument of navigation. And it has been decided that the lien of a wharfinger appertains to the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
Source: Wikisource

Get perspective with Kwize: daily news enlightened by great literature