Sandra Day O'Connor

“ Persons who care for children pursuant to a custody order, and who may be subject to a request for access to the child, are hardly a " 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' " Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S., at 57, 88 S.Ct., at 707 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S., at 79, 86 S.Ct., at 199) . The juvenile court may place a child within its jurisdiction with social service officials or "under supervision in his own home or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms the court deems appropriate." ”

“ Many orders will arise in circumstances entirely devoid of criminal conduct. Even when criminal conduct may exist, the court may properly request production and return of the child, and enforce that request through exercise of the contempt power, for reasons related entirely to the child's well-being and through measures unrelated to criminal law enforcement or investigation. See Maryland Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-814 (c) (1984) . This case provides an illustration: concern for the child's safety underlay the efforts to gain access to and then compel production of Maurice. ”

“ The juvenile court rejected Bouknight's subsequent claim that the contempt order violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination. The court stated that the production of Maurice would purge the contempt and that " [t] he contempt is issued not because she refuse [d] to testify in any proceeding . . . [but] because she has failed to abide by the Order of this Court, mainly [for] the production of Maurice M." App. 150. While that decision was being appealed, Bouknight was convicted of theft and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in separate proceedings. ”

“ The State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution. See Marchetti, 390 U.S., at 58-59, 88 S.Ct., at 707-708 (the "attractive and apparently practical" course of subsequent use restriction is not appropriate where a significant element of the regulatory requirement is to aid law enforcement) ”

“ Finally, production in the vast majority of cases will embody no incriminating testimony, even if in particular cases the act of production may incriminate the custodian through an assertion of possession or the existence, or the identity, of the child. ”

“ We hold that she may not.
* Petitioner Maurice M. is an abused child. When he was three months old, he was hospitalized with a fractured left femur, and examination revealed several partially healed bone fractures and other indications of severe physical abuse. In the hospital, respondent Bouknight, Maurice's mother, was observed shaking Maurice, dropping him in his crib despite his spica cast, and otherwise handling him in a manner inconsistent with his recovery and continued health. ”

“ California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (" [T] he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature") . The juvenile court concluded that Bouknight could comply with the order through the unadorned act of producing the child, and we thus address that aspect of the order. When the government demands that an item be produced, "the only thing compelled is the act of pro ducing the [item] ." ”

“ Fisher, supra, 425 U.S., at 410-413, 96 S.Ct., at 1580-1582. But a person may not claim the Amendment's protections based upon the incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the thing demanded. ”