Supreme Court of the United States

Summary

Supreme Court of the United States Bowman v Monsanto Co. et al. (2013)

And in the more ordinary case, when a farmer purchases Roundup Ready seed qua seed—that is, seed intended to grow a crop—he will be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure, conditions the farmer’s ability to reproduce Roundup Ready; but it does not—could not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after all, would buy the product without some ability to grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Bowman v Monsanto Co. et al. (2013)

That is because, once again, if simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first item containing the invention. The undiluted patent monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the Patent Act promises) , but for only one transaction. And that would result in less incentive for innovation than Congress wanted.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Bowman v Monsanto Co. et al. (2013)

Most notable here, we explained that only a patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit " [a] farmer who legally purchases and plants" a protected seed from saving harvested seed "for replanting." Id., at 140; see id., at 143 (noting that the Patent Act, unlike the PVPA, contains "no exemptio [n] " for "saving seed") . That statement is inconsistent with applying exhaustion to protect conduct like Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to control a patented seed's progeny, then (contrary to J. E. M.) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed.
Source: Wikisource

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