Supreme Court of the United States

Summary

Supreme Court of the United States Dubin v. United States (2023)

In the end, it is hard not to worry that the Court’s “crux” test will simply become a fig leaf for judges’ and jurors’ own subjective moral judgments about whether (as the Court itself puts it) the defendant’s crime is “one that warrants a 2-year mandatory minimum.” Ante, at 17.
I do not question that the Court today has done the best it might to make sense of this statute. It’s just that it faces an impossible task.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Dubin v. United States (2023)

The Government’s broad reading, covering any time another person’s means of identification is employed in a way that facilitates a crime, bears little resemblance to any ordinary meaning of “identity theft.” Consider again an unlicensed doctor who fills out a prescription actually requested by a patient; no one would call that identity theft. Even judges below who agreed with the Government’s reading of §1028A (a) (1) , and ultimately the Government itself, acknowledged that its reading of §1028A (a) (1) does not fairly capture the ordinary meaning of identity theft.
Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States Dubin v. United States (2023)

Dubin’s §1028A (a) (1) conviction cannot stand.
Unfortunately, our opinion cannot end there. Having told lower courts how not to read the statute, we owe them some guidance as to how they should read it. That is where the real challenge begins. Drawing on contextual clues and rules of statutory interpretation, the Court concludes that a violation of §1028A (a) (1) occurs whenever the “use of the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality.”
Source: Wikisource

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