Timothy Tymkovich

“ In 18 U.S.C. 4243, titled "Hospitalization of a person found not guilty only by reason of insanity," Congress established a comprehensive civil commitment procedure for insanity acquittees. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 577 (1994) . Under that procedure, a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is held in custody pending a court hearing that must occur within forty days of the verdict. 18 U.S.C. 4243 (a) and (c) . The evidentiary hearing is commonly referred to as either a "release" or "commitment" hearing, and is civil, not criminal, in nature. ”

“ In support of this proposition, Weed points to Cooper v. Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court stated in the context of pretrial competency hearings that "the difficulty of ascertaining where the truth lies . . . does not justify the additional onus of an especially high standard of proof." 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996) .
Weighing the Mathews factors in this case, we conclude that the government's interest in safeguarding society justifies an elevated burden of proof for insanity acquittees seeking release from hospitalization and treatment. ”

“ Because the Colorado commitment statute challenged in that case "define [d] , as a legal concept, the mental state an acquittee must have before he may be released from confinement," we concluded that "the test is not whether the medical state is medically definable, but whether the acquittee has a mental condition that fits the legal definition." Id.
Similarly, other circuits have cautioned against conflating medical or diagnostic criteria with legal concepts when making determinations about an insanity acquittee's mental condition or a defendant's sanity. ”

“ Although Weed no longer shows symptoms of psychosis and meets no DSM-IV criteria for mental illness, the testifying doctors agree that Weed may still suffer from a condition not triggered since the time of the crime. ”

“ In May 2003, seventeen months after the shooting, the district court held a commitment hearing as required by statute to determine whether Weed was entitled to release under 18 U.S.C. 4243 (2000) , the federal statute governing commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. Mental health experts from both sides testified that Weed suffered from a psychotic episode at the time of the shooting, but that his symptoms had since disappeared. ”

“ It is precisely because future dangerousness is hard to predict that Congress could reasonably conclude that insanity acquittees should not be released absent a heightened showing. Furthermore, the reasonableness of Congress's policy determination that the heightened standard reflects the degree of certainty society believes a judge should reach before releasing a criminally violent person who has been adjudicated insane is not seriously open to doubt. ”

“ With respect to distinctions between classes of individuals not deemed suspect or quasi-suspect or involving a fundamental right, equal protection "provides that a statute shall not treat similarly situated persons differently unless the dissimilar treatment is rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective." ”

“ The experts also agree that, if triggered, the condition may cause Weed to present a substantial danger to others. On this record, the district court did not err in concluding that such a condition constitutes a present mental defect within the meaning of the statute. (7)
We recognize the difficulty that continuing confinement presents for a person that no longer exhibits overt symptoms of mental illness. However, we may not re-weigh evidence presented at the commitment hearing and we must give significant deference to the district court's findings. ”

“ The exact nature of the defect, however, is unknown. (Id. at 29, 32) Dr. Grundy testified that none of the tests he relied upon could predict whether Weed will experience another onset of symptoms. (Id. at 35) He also testified that, according to the DSM-IV, recurrence of a brief psychotic disorder is rare. (Id. at 33)
On cross-examination, Dr. Grundy agreed that a person who has suffered an onset of psychosis is more likely to suffer another occurrence and presents a greater risk to the public than someone who has never had such a condition. ”

“ Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ) . "The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal . . . is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous." Id. (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575Ä76 (1975) ) .
With these standards in mind, we note first that Weed does not contest the statute's preliminary allocation of the burden of proof on him. ”

“ Such medical treatment decreases the negative effect of confinement on Weed's liberty interest because it increases Weed's opportunity to overcome his present mental condition, thereby increasing the probability that the confinement will be ended.
(2) The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Liberty Interest
Addressing the second Mathews factor, Weed argues that a heightened burden of proof directly increases the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest. Aplt. Op. ”

“ Neither issue has been addressed by this circuit, nor by any published federal court decision of which we are aware. For the following reasons, we conclude that 4243 (d) does not run afoul of the Constitution. ”

“ Compare Murdoch, 98 F.3d at 476 (rejecting argument that acquittee was not suffering from a present mental disease or defect because the evidence showed only that his condition might lead to violent activity in the future: " [the] argument erroneously focuses on the symptoms or sideeffects of his mental disease rather than on the existence of the disease itself") , with United States v. ”