Summary

William J. Brennan, Jr. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez — Dissenting Opinion

To the extent that our decision in Will reasoned that States are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 because Congress presumably would not have abrogated state sovereign immunity without a clear statement of its intent to do so, the opposite presumption should control this case: Because Congress has such plenary legal authority over a Territory's affairs and because a Territory can assert no immunity against the laws of Congress (except insofar as Congress itself grants immunity) , we ought to presume that Territories are "persons" for purposes of § 1983.
Source: Wikisource

William J. Brennan, Jr. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez — Dissenting Opinion

I do not find this awkwardness determinative, however, because § 1983 also extends to natural persons who act under color of territorial law. The under-color-of-law requirement serves to ensure that not every act of these natural persons in their private capacities gives rise to § 1983 liability. The only method of avoiding the redundancy of which the majority complains would have been to replace the catchall term "persons" with a detailed list of each separate category of possible defendants. That approach would have been even more "awkward" than the one ultimately chosen by Congress.
Source: Wikisource

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