North Vietnamese Army

“ The Viet~minh Regroupees (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, August, 1966, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA) , 25–26; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 February 1956) SECRET. The former speculates based on interviews with POVs and defectors, but reaches conclusions similar to those of the latter. A like 1954 estimate by the U.S. Army Attache, Saigon, is included in Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 October 1954) , 6.
69. Fall, Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 302.
70. Some 1,000 Chinese advisers entered North Vietnam; hundreds of Vietnamese were trained in China ”

“ While in Tonkin the Viet Minh flowed in through and behind the French and continued to build a nation and unify the people with surprising efficiency, in the South they were unable to do so. Not only were the Viet Minh centers of power in the North and the China base area too remote to support effectively the southern insurgency, but also the French had imitated the Japanese in arming and supplying certain South Vietnamese factions, fomenting civil war against the southern arm of the Viet Minh. ”

“ External pressures from France and from China proved more difficult. The French capitalized on the relative weakness of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam, and the dissension among the Vietnamese there to overthrow the DRV government in Saigon, and to force the Viet Minh to resort to guerrilla warfare. In famine-wracked North Vietnam, Chinese hordes under booty-minded warlords descended on the DRV, supplanting its legal government with committees of their own sponsoring and systematically looting. Ho vainly sought aid abroad; not even the Soviet Union proved helpful. ”

“ These factors, then—the dual mission, strategy, tactics, organization, manpower policy, equipment, and training—all directly contributed to the formation of a Vietnamese military establishment, and in particular to an ARVN, that in 1960 bore overall resemblance to the U.S. military establishment and particularly close resemblance to the U.S. Army Unfortunately, events since 1960 have demonstrated that the ARVN was not well-suited to countering the internal security threat; its efficacy against overt aggression still remains to be tested. ”

“ These military operations have succeeded in practically eliminating the Binh Xuyen and Cao Dai forces. The Hoa Hao, operating along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, even though small, still give the Vietnamese some embarrassment and required the employment of a small portion of the Vietnamese Army against their operations. The over-all success against these anti-government forces has facilitated the release of the majority of the Vietnamese units from pacification missions, thus increasing emphasis on unit training and the concomitant increased effectiveness of the armed forces. ”

“ From the Communists' standpoint, the crucial matter was not the volume of casualties they sustained, but the survival of the guerrilla infrastructure in South Vietnam. In spite of their disregard for human life, the North Vietnamese did not wish to counter the American military steamroller in the populated coastal plain of I Corps. There, the relatively open terrain favored the overwhelming power of the Marines' supporting arms. ”

“ By mid-1963, NVA strength was over 10. battalions, with some 5000 to 7000 men plus 3,000 advisers, and new arms and supplies were arriving constantly. For example, members of the Polish ICC team in Hanoi, told their counterparts in Laos in August 1963 that the DRV was dispatching daily shipments of military equipment into Laos, a/⁠and in February 1964 a Pathet Lao officer in southern Laos stated that the DRV was shipping in new and heavier arms, including tanks. b/
a/ Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/TDCSDB 3657725, 4 November 1963, cited in "North Vietnamese Violations..." ”

“ PAVN Modernizes At the close of hostilities, the Viet Minh probably had some 300,000 to 400,000 men under arms—about 130,000 regulars of which all but about 70,000 were concentrated in North Vietnam and Laos. (See Map, ff.) 83 The French had fielded 420,000 troops, including about 200,000 Vietnamese. Both sides received extensive aid from non-combatants, the French chiefly from the U.S., and the DRV chiefly from China. ”

“ There were the Nung tribal people, who had been allied with the French during the war, and would probably have clashed with the North Vietnamese government whatever its policies. The Chinese shadow over the Viet Minh deepened Nung fears, and strengthened tendencies within the Chinese community of Hanoi to split along Nationalist/Communist lines after the fashion of overseas Chinese throughout the Far East; many Chinese fled. Rich or landed Vietnamese could, with reason, be apprehensive over DRV policies toward the wealthy, and be drawn to the presumably more open South. ”

“ They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early 1965) . Instead they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications specialists who built the Viet Cong's military force into what it is today. They also became the village, district, provincial and regional committee chiefs and key committee members who
built the Viet Cong's political apparatus. ”

“ Such a withdrawal would hasten the rate of communist advances in the Far East as a whole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to communism. In my opinion, the chance of success is not only worth the gamble; we cannot afford to let free Vietnam go by default."3
On the narrower level, several considerations tended to urge an affirmative decision concerning a training role for the U.S.:
1. Throughout the French–Indochina war, U.S. authorities continually urged the French to create and train a Vietnamese National Army. ”

“ The idea of training the VNA for internal security contradicted NSC 162/2 which "envisages reliance on indigenous ground forces to the maximum extent possible" in territorial defense. Citing the threat from "considerable numbers of Viet Minh guerrillas and sympathizers ... known to be or suspected of being within the territory of free Vietnam" and the GVN "intention of requesting the phased withdrawal of the French forces by 1956" the Chiefs said:
This would result in a complete military vacuum unless the Vietnamese are adequately prepared to take over progressively as the French withdraw. ”

“ The Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps (in villages throughout Free Vietnam) are of material assistance in supplementing the efforts of the Vietnamese Army in the accomplishment of the internal security mission. As these para-military units become better equipped and trained, their increased capability for assuming the major role in maintaining internal security will afford necessary relief of Army units for training. Simultaneously, this will add to Free Vietnam's potential for providing resistance to external aggression. ”

“ That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Viet-Nam is posed by the steady expansion of guerrilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base. ”

“ A major reason for the ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese National Army is its lack of adequately trained officers. Only about one percent have received training roughly equivalent to that of a US army officer of field grade and virtually none has a comparable background of staff and command experience. Very few of the Vietnamese officers would be competent even in assignments justified by their training and experience, and even fewer are capable of an adequate performance at the higher positions of responsibility which they now hold. ”

“ The North Vietnamese know that they cannot achieve their aggressive purposes by force. There may be hard fighting before a settlement is reached; but, I can assure you, it will yield no victory to the Communist cause. ”

“ We still have a chance of beating them if we can give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political basis of action. Since both of these actions will have to be carried out by Vietnamese forces in their Defense establishment, it is worthwhile to make U. S. help to the Vietnamese in the contested provinces along these sorely needed lines a priority mission of the U. S. military in Vietnam. The political actions should be the implementing of Vietnamese governmental policy by Vietmanese force commanders, aided by Vietnamese psychological warfare units. ”

“ In early 1967, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, an interagency study group was convened from CIA, DIA, and the Department of State for a comprehensive review of U. S. intelligence concerning: "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam." 109/ The resultant study validates the foregoing ob servations on the regroupees in all respects, as do other captured documents and interrogation reports. Taken together, available evidence indicates that infiltration of regroupees fr om North to South Vietnam began as early as 1955. ”

“ General John W. O'Daniel, head of the MAAG in Indochina, as being capable of turning the tide and leading to a decisive victory over the Viet Minh contributed to Washington's agreement to substantially raise the level of assistance. But equally important, the Navarre Plan, by being a concrete proposal which held out the premise of ending the long war, put France in a position to pressure the United States for more funds to underwrite the training and equipping of nine additional French battalions and a number of new Vietnamese units. ”

“ After Dien Bien Phu and the withdrawal of most French forces to the Tonkin Delta, Viet Minh strength in and around the Delta was reported as 94 infantry battalions, 1 artillery division, 110 district companies, and from 40,000 to 50,000 militia. French–Vietnamese strength stood at 109 battalions (of which some 60 percent was VNA) and about 80,000 auxiliary troops and militia. ”

“ At the close of the Franco-Viet Minh War, some 60,000 men were serving in organized Viet Minh units in South Viet Nam. For the regroupments to North Vietnam, these units were augmented with large numbers of untrained young men -- who were later known among the regroupees in North Vietnam as "soldiers of Geneva." ”

“ The State Department thought that Indochina was so critical from a foreign policy viewpoint that intervention might be necessary. But DOD and the JCS, estimating that air-naval action alone could not stem the surging Viet Minh, recommended that rather than intervening directly, the U.S. should concentrate on urging Paris to train an expanded indigenous army, and should exert all possible pressures — in Europe as well as in Asia — to motivate the French to fight hard for a military victory. ”

“ The U.S. manifested increasing concern over the conflict in Indochina, but through 1949 American policy continued to regard the war as fundamentally a matter for French resolution. It is clear on the record that American policy-makers of the day perceived the vacuity of French policies in 1946 and 1947. The U.S., in its representations to France, consistently deplored the prospect of protracted war in Vietnam, and urged meaningful concessions to Vietnamese nationalism. However, the U.S. always stopped short of endorsing Ho Chi Minh, deterred by Ho's history of communist affiliation. ”

“ Strength: It is estimated that the Viet Cong in North Vietnam, currently have available approximately 268,000 regular army troops organized into 14 Infantry Divisions, 1 Artillery Division, 1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groupment, 11 independent Infantry Regiments, 5 Security Regiments, plus comb at support and service support units. In addition, there are para-military forces estimated to number up to approximately 235,000 personnel, which are organized as two separate forces, the Provincial Forces and the Armed Militia ... ”

“ On the tactical level the Vietnamese forces also came to reflect standard U.S. doctrine—with one possible exception, that of "pacification."
Thus the tactical doctrine which will probably emerge from the present [1956] reorganization and training period will most likely reflect past, relatively small-unit, infantry-type operations under the French; the inherently mobile infantry nature of the present forces influenced by increased firepower; a capability for coordinated operations up to division and eventually corps level ”

“ Militia type home guards and civil guards should be trained and equipped. Accelerated efforts should be undertaken to develop the para-military and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities should be under centralized direction. Border and Coastal Patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, should be closely coordinated with Vietnamese ground, air, and naval operations in the counter-insurgency campaign. ”

“ No effective resistance is anticipated from the few remaining Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Activity of Viet Minh cadres in Free Vietnam has accelerated. While primarily political in nature, it does pose a threat to internal security. These cadres are attempting to infiltrate and take over the dissident sects. Reports indicate that they have succeeded in these efforts with a fraction of the Hoa Hao. On the other hand, approximately 7,000 sect troops have indicated their loyalty by joining forces with the government and have recently been integrated as a part of the National Army. ”