Soviet–Afghan War

“ The ambush is a favorite tactic of the guerrilla since it allows him to mass forces covertly, attack the enemy, seize needed supplies and retreat before the enemy can effectively react. The ambush has long been part of the Afghan warrior tradition and has been a key feature of historic Afghan warfare — whether fighting other tribes, the British or the government. The Mujahideen ambush served to attack the Soviet/DRA lines of communication, provided needed supplies, and forced the bulk of Soviet/DRA maneuver forces to perform security missions. ”

“ The Soviets realized thatthey were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering"death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hopeof winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do. ”

“ And when the programs are devastated, American interests are harmed. My friends, it's my duty as President to say to you again tonight that there is no surer way to lose freedom than to lose our resolve. Today the brave people of Afghanistan are showing that resolve. The Soviet Union says it wants a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, yet it continues a brutal war and props up a regime whose days are clearly numbered. We are ready to support a political solution that guarantees the rapid withdrawal of all Soviet troops and genuine self-determination for the Afghan people. ”

“ During this stage of the war, the Mujahideen lived intheir own houses in the midst of the population. Their food, water andshelter was willingly supplied by the populace. As a result, many civil-ians died when the Soviets launched their operation. The largenumber of reported civilian deaths could be a result of lack of officers'control and unit discipline or deliberate policy. ”

“ The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They have been confronted with occupation — by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al-Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand — America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. ”

“ Consequently the Soviet Union was forced to use mostly its own soldiers to carry the fight to the Mujahideen.
Afghan military officers who openly joined the Mujahideen faced many obstacles in integrating fully into the resistance hierarchy, based in Pakistan. Some faction leaders saw these former military officers as a challenge to their leadership and their factional interests and tried to sideline the professionals. Factions with a fundamentalist Islamic orientation were generally more opposed to accepting those military officers who had trained in and served under the old regimes. ”

“ Technology can provide advantages but is not decisive in this type of war. Soviet smart bombs had a decided impact when an appropriate target set could be identified. U.S.-supplied, shoulder-fired Stinger air defense missiles, in the hands of the Mujahideen, created a great deal of consternation and led to a dramatic change in Soviet air tactics. Neither system, however, was a war winner. The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. ”

“ Crew-served weapons also limited guerrilla mobility.
Soviet high performance jet fighters and bombers played a significant strategic role, but not a tactically significant one. The Soviets used their air forces to devastate the countryside and force the populace to leave in order to deny food to the Mujahideen. The Soviet air force destroyed farms, crops, animal herds, orchards and irrigation systems and forced millions of people to flee. The Mujahideen were then forced to carry their rations along with the other impedimenta of war. ”

“ From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate into Kabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in the heart of the enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. ”

“ Although some historians lookedat the British experience fighting the Afghan mountain tribesmen,most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union pos-sessed an unprecedented advantage in fire power, technology andmilitary might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied armsand material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creat-ing a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the Soviet flank, not defeatingthe Soviet Union. ”

“ The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted effort to find and destroy these positions. The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection of the place and time of tactical actions against the enemy. In areas where the local population remained in their homes and had not emigrated, local resistance units preferred to reserve for themselves the choice of time, place and method of action against the enemy and not let outside Mujahideen groups risk their security and plans by conducting combat in their area without their consent. ”

“ Throughout the war, the Soviets always left one side unguarded.At around noon, 100 to 120 Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from Zalakhan and Walakan, which are south and southeast of Spin Zirat. These villages were in the sector that the Soviets left unguarded. Thearrival of the reinforcements turned the tide and eventually promptedthe Soviets to withdraw about 1800 hours. We destroyed three armored vehicles on the Sarpooza front and two on the Mahkama front.
Sometimes the bombs and artillery fire would block the exits toour bunkers. We would have to go out at night to dig them out. ”

“ But Afghanistan was in full revolt, thedispirited Afghan army was unable to cope, and the specter of defeatfollowing a Soviet withdrawal haunted the. Politburo. Invasion andoverthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting thehundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army wastrained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were nottrained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small,indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrainand circumstances were to their advantage. ”

“ The Mujahideen use the Mamur Hotel ambush site over and over again, yet apparently the Soviets or DRA seldom dismounted troops to search the area to spoil the ambush or to try to set a counterambush. This last example is from 1986, yet there seems to be no learning curve on the part of the Soviets. Air support is tardy, artillery fire is unavailable and there is no reserve to move against the ambush. ”

“ The Soviet Union bears a grave responsibility for the continuing suffering of the Afghan people, the massive violations of human rights, and the international tension which has resulted from its unprovoked attack. The Soviet Union must understand that the world will not forget, as it has not forgotten the peoples of the other captive nations from Eastern Europe to Southwest Asia—who have suffered from Soviet aggression. ”

“ Further, the heavy weapons group needed more men. Ten men cannot adequately handle four mortars, let alone eight.
The Soviets contributed to their own disaster. The forward security element "cleared" the area by simply driving through it and since they were not fired on, they assumed that it was safe. This was a favorite Mujahideen ambush site complete with well-prepared positions. The Mujahideen had conducted several ambushes from this very site in the past. As a minimum, the Soviets should have sent a force to destroy the positions prior to the convoy departure. ”

“ Three years after the invasion, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not a success. Even with the augmentation of their forces to close to 105,000 men this year, the Soviets, with the puppet Karmal regime, have not been able to control the countryside or secure many cities. They have failed to rebuild the Communist-controlled Afghan Army and to create an effective government. ”

“ The Mujahideen were skilled exfiltrators and often small groups of Soviets or DRA guarding the cordon would allow the Mujahideen to escape rather than risk a fire fight at uneven odds. The Soviets resorted to scatterable mines, ground sensors, parachute flares and other technology to prevent escapes, but Mujahideen groups would exfiltrate singly,or in small groups, and regroup outside the encirclement. ”

“ Afghanistan lay directlyin this contested area between two empires. Russia described hermotives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and toestablish order and control along her southern border. The British,however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus,Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feelthreatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near Indiaand ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated thatRussian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to awarm-water port. ”

“ As a nation, we believed that history repeats itself. What happened in the 19th Century to the invading British would also be the fate of the Soviet invaders. Philosophically, the Soviets believed that history is unidirectional, progressive and does not repeat itself. ”

“ Soviet conscripts would sell fuel,ammunition, weapons, batteries and military equipment for hashish,food and Afghan money. They would use the money in the bazaars ofKabul to buy western stereos, music tapes, cigarettes and clothing.Some goods were available in the Soviet PX, but conscripts had littleaccess or cash so they tried to shop locally for items they wanted. Mohammad Humayun Shahin joined the Mujahideen as a high school student and served asa combatant and commander in the HIH urban guerrillas in the southwestern suburbs ofKabul in the Chardehi District. ”

“ The Soviets decided to break this link between the populace and the guerrilla by driving the populace out of the countryside. Soviet air and artillery attacked villages, standing crops, orchards,animal herds, granaries, water mills and irrigation systems. Eventually the populace was driven out of many rural areas and the Mujahideen could no longer readily subsist in these areas. With the agricultural system destroyed, the Mujahideen had to transport their own food and forage. The Mujahideen factions responded to this crisis by establishing fixed supply bases within Afghanistan. ”

“ The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. Theykilled several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of mymen who was unarmed. I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but thesubsequent actions of the Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. Ihave written many poems of protest against their current activities.
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrisonover a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positionsto avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrolsto find the firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. ”

“ The rural population will-ingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen, since theMujahideen were mostly local residents. The Soviets decided to attackMujahideen logistics by forcing the rural population off of their farmsinto refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran or into the cities ofAfghanistan. ”

“ Isaw that part of the Soviets were heading toward my 13 men. TheSoviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark their position.Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine gun fire.Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them. Afterthe air attack, the Soviets began attacking my 13-man group. I wasmidway between the attacking Soviets and my men—about 500meters away. I looked in my binoculars and saw that another groupof Soviets were down in the valley picking up the pliers, first aidpackets and money I had discarded. ”

“ A series of Soviet and DRA security bases and outposts protected both highways. In September 1985, several Mujahideen groups combined to conduct a raid on the Soviet/DRA security outposts in the Lataband pass east of Kabul (Map 2-7 - Lataband) . Lataband is located on the old Kabul-Sarobi highway. The Lataband pass was protected by a Soviet base atMulla Omar in the west, and a DRA Sarandoy base at Lataband in the east. The area between the two bases was protected by several security outposts manned by DRA military detachments. ”

“ Manygovernment people also surrendered to us. It was a bonanza. InNawaz Khan's group, they lost three KIA and seven WIA. InSidiqullah's group they lost two KIA. We kept the district capital forsome time until a joint Soviet/DRA force pushed us out and reestab-lished DRA government in Alingar. COMMENTARY: Alingar is about 30 kilometers from the province capitalof Mehtar Lam. At this point of the war, the Mujahideen were deter-mined to control political centers so that they could claim to be a legit-imate government in Afghanistan. The DRA was equally determinedto prevent this. ”

“ The Mujahideen caught the Soviet column straddling the river and forced it to fight two separate, unsupported battles. There was little room to maneuver except over the sourthern escape route. Second, the time of the ambush was optimum. The late afternoon arrival gave Mujahideen gunners just enough time to inflict maximum damage, but not enough time for Soviet air power to react. Soviet artillery could cover only a portion of the battlefield and apparently no forward Crossing the Panjshir River, or any of Afghanistan’s major rivers, is always very risky. ”