Term limits

“ Opponents contend that far from meeting the burden of persuasion, term limits are likely to worsen existing problems, such as the partisanship of the confirmation process, while at the same time introducing new problems. In addition, opponents argue that term limits would be extraordinarily difficult to implement.
Most fundamentally, term limit opponents deny that it would be good for each President to receive two appointments to the Court. ”

“ Nevertheless, Congress has ignored our desire for term limits not only by proposing excessively long terms for its own members but also by utterly refusing to pass an amendment for genuine congressional term limits. Congress has a clear conflict of interest in proposing a term limits amendment to the United States Constitution. A majority of both Republicans and Democrats in the 104th Congress voted against a constitutional amendment containing the term limits passed by a wide margin of Nebraska voters. The people, not Congress, should set term limits. ”

“ But by regularizing Supreme Court appointments, term limits would make the system of Supreme Court appointments fairer, less arbitrary, and more predictable, and therefore enhance the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Finally, in addition to these arguments based in constitutional structure and principle, proponents of term limits also believe that they would enhance the Court’s decisionmaking, on the ground that a regular rotation in personnel tends to improve the quality of decisionmaking over time. [21] Judges, like others, are inevitably a product of their time. ”

“ We hereby establish as the official position of the citizens and State of Nebraska that our elected officials should enact by constitutional amendment congressional term limits of three terms in the United States House of Representatives and of two terms in the United States Senate.
The career politicians dominating Congress have a conflict of interest that prevents Congress from being what the founders intended, the branch of government closest to the people. The politicians have refused to heed the will of the people for term limits; they have voted to dramatically raise their own pay ”

“ From the perspective of those who urge term limits, these various provisions of the Constitution aim to make the individual members of the judiciary independent at any given point in time, but the composition of the judiciary as a whole responsive over time to the people’s will, as expressed through its electoral decisions about who occupies the presidency and the Senate. ”

“ Proponents of term limits caution that one should not confuse the argument that the Court’s composition should reflect electoral outcomes over time with a claim that Presidents have a right to make the Supreme Court generate a particular set of results. In our constitutional system, judges and Justices are not and should not be considered the mere representatives of political parties or the creatures of a particular President, and the argument for term limits does not rest on such assumptions. ”

“ Third, some commentators and scholars have also expressed concern that term limits (whether through constitutional amendment or by statute) would threaten the basic structural principle of judicial independence. [29] They argue that life tenure is essential to that independence, as evidenced in our longstanding historical practice. Opponents are not comforted by citations to foreign courts, or to the state supreme courts where judicial terms are renewable through different systems of election or reappointment. ”

“ While it might be thought that term limits reduce the pressure for Presidents to appoint younger people, such that most Justices who serve eighteen-year terms may still view their positions on the Court as their last major position, other Justices who have served some portion of the eighteen-year term might decide that they would prefer to take a different unlimited position in government or the private sector rather than filling out the rest of the term. ”

“ These arguments undoubtedly have considerable force, but I do not think they can support a decision invalidating this Act on its face. Section 1 of Art. II vests all of the executive power in the sitting President, and limits his term of office to four years. ”

“ As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour—a considerable number would have done so in case an easy & effectual removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term, seven years for example, with a subsequent & perpetual ineligibility, or a short term with a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. ”

“ On the other hand, if there was to be some form of popular election, an opportunity for reëlection was thought to be a desirable incentive to good behavior. Six or seven years was taken as an acceptable length for a single term and four years a convenient tenure if reëlection was permitted. ”

“ I state it in my place in Senate, and before my fellow-Senators who are of the other persuasion, I do not think it. There is no proposition to extend the term of office where it is now fixed, nor in any wise limit the constitutional power of removal from office. The proposition is simply and only that where a new appointment shall be made the element of fitness shall be decisive. Can any Democrat object to that?
How many Democrats are there in office now? How many will there ever be under the spoils system? The Republicans have possession of the Government for two years and more. ”

“ Hence the real objection to the appointment of judges as such is that when appointed they have held office for life. The entire objection, therefore, to appointment may be met by limiting the tenure of the appointed judge and by a variety of provisions for his retirement. He would, of course, be subject to impeachment. He might very well in addition be subject to some mode of legislative recall such as was proposed for the chief justice. His term may be limited to five years or seven years, thus requiring a retirement at the end of each period unless a reappointment is made. ”

“ But while the power of nomination and appointment is left fairly where the Constitution has placed it, I think the whole field of regulation is open to legislative discretion. If a law were to pass, declaring that district attorneys, or collectors of customs, should hold their offices four years, unless removed on conviction for misbehavior, no one could doubt its constitutional validity; because the legislature is naturally competent to prescribe the tenure of office. And is a reasonable check on the power of removal any thing more than a qualification of the tenure of office? ”

“ Another point of difference is in regard to the power of instant removal, many of the most pronounced reformers of the civil service holding that power to be essential, and believing that it will not be abused so long as the removing power cannot arbitrarily appoint the successor. The matured opinion of others is that a tenure of office definitely fixed for a term of years, during which the incumbent cannot be disturbed except upon substantial written charges, will secure a better class of officials. ”

“ The incumbent would be always busy keeping his influence in repair to secure reappointment, and the applicant would be equally busy in seeking such influence to procure the place, and as the fixed terms would be constantly expiring, the eager and angry intrigue and contest of influence would be as endless as it is now. This certainly would not be reform.
But would not reform be secured by adding to a fixed limited term the safeguard of removal for cause only? Removal for cause alone means, of course, removal for legitimate cause, such as dishonesty, negligence, or incapacity. ”

“ We favor appointments based upon merit, fixed terms of office, and such an administration of the civil-service laws as will afford equal opportunities to all citizens of ascertained fitness. "We declare it to be the unwritten law of this Republic, established by custom and usage of 100 years, and sanctioned by the examples of the greatest and wisest of those who founded and have maintained our Government, that no man should be eligible for a third term of the Presidential office. ”

“ We do not assert the proposition that a person elected to an office for a definite term has any such contract with the government or with the appointing body as to prevent the legislature or other proper authority from abolishing the office, or diminishing its duration, or removing him from office. ”

“ Gentlemen will probably judge according to their habits of mind, and according to their opportunities of observation. Those who have seen much of the evils of elections will probably incline to long Parliaments; those who have seen little or nothing of these evils will probably incline to a short term. Only observe this, that, whatever may be the legal term, it ought to be a year longer than that for which Parliaments ought ordinarily to sit. For there must be a general election at the end of the legal term, let the state of the country be what it may. ”

“ The office involved powers which might become dangerous to the people, and, as it was elective, rotation was applied to protect them; when appointment was substituted for election, a definite term was provided to take the place of rotation. The justices of the peace were not usually elective, and, as their functions were such as might possibly become dangerous, it was provided that they should be commissioned for fixed periods. In both these cases limitation of term was clearly a substitute for rotation. ”

“ Secondly, while a long term is intended to guard against the too frequent changes in the laws, it may also prevent, for too long a time, the amendment or the repeal of bad laws. Such amendment or repeal may be hastened by the election of new members in the place of the one-third who retire every two years. ”

“ There is first the will of the legislature. When it confers a right, it may confer it, either for a limited, or for an unlimited time. In the term unlimited time, we include the power of tradition, or transfer, in all its shapes. If the time is limited, by the declaration of the legislature, either to a certain number of years, or the life of the party, the fact which terminates the right is obvious. If a man possesses a right, unlimited in point of time, the events are three by which it has been commonly fixed that it may be terminated: 1. ”

“ The constitutional amendments shortening the Presidential term from six to four years and prescribing the tenure of the members of the Congress—four years for Representatives and six years for Senators, with one-third of the members of the Senate to be elected every two years—require the setting of a definite schedule for the holding of elections so that, including the election for provincial and municipal officials, they may not occur more than once every two years. ”

“ The danger is that the indulgence and attachments of the people will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard, that re-election through life shall become habitual, and election for life follow that. General Washington set the example of voluntary retirement after eight years. I shall follow it. And a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to any one after awhile who shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a disposition to establish it by an amendment of the Constitution. ”

“ And as a power in government, if it exist at all, it is perennial and universal and can give what duration it pleases to its exercise, whether for two years or for more than two years. If it can be made to endure for two years, it can be made to endure for more. There is no other power that can pronounce the limit of its duration against the time expressed in it and its justification practically marks the doom of the judicial judgment on legislative action. ”

“ Gentlemen must perceive that I speak only of the general tendency and alarming character of such an increase, without reference to the motives which have now recommended it. They are doubtless pure. But its propriety is to be tried by the reasons for it, and not by motives. * * *
If this system is to be extended to the six new states, because most excellent, without regard to the effect of such an extension on the Supreme Court itself, and without regard to population or expense, then why not extend it to every part of the Union now destitute of it? ”

“ Beyond all question Civil-Service Reform must begin by a limitation of the President to one term, so that the temptation to use the appointing power for personal ends may disappear from our system, and this great disturbing force cease to exist. ”

“ An amendment for the purposes of § 114 (b) (4) would be timely only if filed within the period provided by the statute for filing the original return. No other time limitation would have statutory sanction. To extend the time beyond the limits prescribed in the Act is a legislative not a judicial function. ”

“ The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited [p177] and acts allowed are of equal obligation. ”