Anthony Collins

“ What difficulty can there be in stating a plain matter of fact, and describing what every body feels? What need of so much Philosophy? And why so many contradictions on the subject? And how can all men experience Liberty, when it is allow’d that the common notion of liberty is false, or not experienc’d; and a new notion of Liberty, not thought on before (or thought on but by few) is set up as matter of experience? This could not happen if matter of fact was clear for liberty. ”

“ May you live long and happy, in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all those blessings which Providence has bestowed on you, and your virtues entitled you to. I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am dead.” Locke evidently looked on Collins as the man who would carry on the torch of truth when it had fallen from his own hand. ”

“ For in arguing against the Epicurean system of chance, do we not say, (and that justly) that it is impossible for chance ever to have produc’d an orderly system of things, as not being a cause suit’d to the effect; and that an orderly system of things, which had a beginning, must have had an intelligent Agent for its cause, as being the only proper cause to that effect? All which implies that causes are suited, or have relation to some particular effects, and not to others. And if they be suited to some particular effect and not to others, they can be no causes at all to those others. ”

“ Whereas when the mind ballances or compares Ideas or motives together, it is then no less necessarily determin’d to a state of Indifferency by the appearances of those Ideas and motives, than it is necessarily determin’d in the very moment of action. Were a man to be at liberty in this state of indifferency, he ought to have it in his power to be not indifferent, at the same time that he is indifferent.
If experience therefore proves the liberty contended for by the foregoing asserters of liberty, it proves men to have no liberty from necessity. ”

“ By which last principle we are as necessarily led to conceive a cause of action in man, where we see not the particular cause itself; as we are to conceive that a greater weight determines a scale, tho’ our eyes discover no difference between the two weights.
But let us put a case of true equality or Indifference, and what I have asserted will more manifestly appear true. Let two eggs appear perfectly alike to a man; and let him have no will to eat or use eggs. ”

“ Men are already sufficiently unhappy by their several volitions; founded on the wrong use of their faculties, and on the mistaken appearances of things. But what miserable beings would they be, if instead of choosing evil under the appearance of good (which is the only case wherein men now choose evil) they were indifferent to good and evil, and had the power to choose evil as evil, and did actually choose evil as evil in virtue of that power? They would, in such a state, or with such a liberty, be like infants that cannot walk, left to go alone, with Liberty to fall ”

“ But considering how little men are moved by the authority of those who professedly maintain opinions contrary to theirs, though at the same time they themselves embrace no opinion but on the authority of somebody, I shall waive all the advantages that I might draw from the authority of such philosophers and divines as are undoubtedly on my side, and for that reason shall not enter into a more particular detail of them, but shall offer the authority of such men who profess to maintain Liberty. ”

“ Secondly, when I affirm Necessity, I contend only for what is called Moral Necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity. And here also I have the concurrence of almost all the greatest asserters of Liberty, who either expressly maintain moral necessity, or the thing signified by those words. ”

“ Since then we can think of nothing any farther than we have Ideas, and can signify all the Ideas we have by words to one another; why should we not be able to put one Idea into a Proposition as well as another? Why not to compare ideas together about one subject as well as another? And why not to range one sort of Propositions into order and method, as well as another? When we use the term God, the Idea signify'd thereby, ought to be as distinct and determinate in us, as the Idea of a triangle or a square is, when we discourse of either of them ”

“ For proof whereof let any man examine the clearest and acutest authors who have written for Liberty, or discourse with those who think Liberty a matter of experience, and he will see that they allow that the will follows the judgment of the understanding, and that when two objects are presented to man’s choice, one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot choose the worst—that is, cannot choose evil as evil. ”

“ If he wills or pleases, he can think of this or that subject, stop short, or pursue his thoughts, deliberate, or defer deliberation, as he pleases, resolve or suspend his resolution as he pleases, unless prevented by pain, or a fit of an apoplexy, or some such intervening restraint or compulsion.
And is it not a great perfection in man to be able in relation both to his thoughts and actions, to do as he wills or pleases in all those cases of pleasure and interest? Nay, can a greater and more beneficial power in man be conceived than to be able to do as he wills or pleases? ”

“ And why should man be deem’d free in the performance of the same or like actions? He has indeed more knowledge than sheep. He takes in more things, as matter of pleasure, than they do; being sometimes mov’d with notions of honour and virtue, as well as with those pleasures he has in common with them. He is also more mov’d by absent things, and things future, than they are. He is also subject to more vain fears, more mistakes and wrong actions, and infinitely more absurdities in notions. ”

“ A man determined in his choice by the appearing nature of things, and the usage of his intellectual powers, never makes a wrong choice, but by mistaking the true relation of things to him. But a being, indifferent to all objects, and swayed by no motives in his choice of objects, chooses at a venture; and only makes a right choice when it happens (as the author justly expresses his notion) that he chooses an object, which he can by his creating power render so agreeable, as that it may be called a rightly chosen object. ”

“ All the various modifications of the man, his opinions, prejudices, temper, habit, and circumstances, are to be taken in, and considered as causes of election, no less than the objects without us among which we choose; and these will ever incline or determine our wills, and make the choice we do make preferable to us, though the external objects of our choice are ever so much alike to each other. And, for example, in the case of choosing one out of the two eggs that are alike, there is first, in the person choosing, will to eat or use an egg. ”

“ But, secondly, some of the patrons of Liberty contend that we are free in our choice among things indifferent, or alike, as in choosing one out of two or more eggs; and that in such cases the man, having no motives from the objects, is not necessitated to choose one rather than the other, because there is no perceivable difference between them, but chooses one by a mere act of willing without any cause but his own free act. ”

“ Upon which account, men are very indulgent to, and pardon the unintelligible discourses of Theologers and Philosophers, which treat of the sublime points in theology and philosophy. And there is no question in the whole compass of speculation, of which men have written more obscurely, and of which it is thought more impossible to discourse clearly, and concerning which men more expect, and pardon obscure discourse, than upon the subjects of Liberty and Necessity. ”

“ VI. My sixth and last argument to prove man a necessary agent is; if man was not a necessary agent determined by pleasure and pain, he would have no notion of morality, or motive to practise it; the distinction between morality and immorality, virtue and vice, would be lost; and man would not be a moral agent. ”

“ But man, as an intelligent necessary agent, has these further pleasures and advantages. He, by not being indifferent to objects, is moved by the goodness and agreeableness of them as they appear to him, and as he knows them by reflection and experience. It is not in his power to be indifferent to what causes pleasure or pain. He cannot resist the pleasure arising from the use of his passions, appetites, senses, and reason; and if he suspends his choice of an object, that is presented to him by any of these powers as agreeable ”

“ So that man, with a faculty of choice indifferent to all objects, must make more wrong choices, than man consider’d as a necessary being; in the same proportion, as acting as it happens, is a worse direction to chuse right, than the use of our senses, experience, and reason.
3. Thirdly, the existence of such an arbitrary faculty, to chuse without regard to the qualities of objects, would destroy the use of our senses, appetites, passions, and reason; which have been given us to direct us in our inquiries after truth, in our pursuit after happiness, and to preserve our beings. ”

“ And if the immanent acts of God are necessary, then the transient must be so likewise, as being the certain effects of his immanent acts; and a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. And this necessity, to which God is thus subject, is, adds he, no absurdity to some. God is, according to them, necessarily just, true, and good, by an intrinsic Necessity that arises from his own infinite perfection. ”

“ To which I answer, that all these, according to me, are necessary causes to determine certain men’s wills to do what we desire of them; and are therefore useful as acting on such necessary agents to whom they are necessary causes of action; but would be of no use if men had free-will, or their wills were not moved by them. So that they who make this objection must run into the absurdities of saying that that cause is useful, which is no cause of action and serves not to change the will, and that that cause is useless which necessitates the effect. ”

“ You must take from a Man his senses, if you take from him the power of assenting; for it is as necessary the mind should yield to what is clear, as that a scale hanging on a balance should sink with a weight laid on it. For as all living creatures cannot but desire what is agreeable to their natures, so they cannot but assent to what is clear. ”

“ In fine he is so far from thinking that there is the least foundation, from experience, for the said notion of Liberty, that he treats it as a chimera, and compares it to the magical power of the fairies to transform things. ”

“ For what can be more irrational and inconsistent than to be able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us, and to assent to what we see to be evidently false, and thereby inwardly give the lie to the understanding?
3. Were Liberty defined [4] a power to will evil (knowing it to be evil) as well as good; that would be an imperfection in man, considered as a sensible being, if it be an imperfection in such a being to be miserable. For willing evil is choosing to be miserable, and bringing knowingly destruction on ourselves. ”

“ Some give the name Liberty to actions, which, when described, are plainly actions that are necessary. Others, though appealing to vulgar experience, yet inconsistently therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and treating it after an intricate manner. Others are driven into the defence of Liberty by difficulties imagined to flow from the doctrine of Necessity, combating what they allow to be matter of seeming experience. ”

“ Were Liberty defined a power to overcome our reason by the force of choice, as a celebrated author [2] may be supposed to mean when he says [3] the will seems to have so great a power over the understanding being overruled by the election of the will, not only takes what is good to be evil, but is also compelled to admit what is false to be true; man would, with the exercise of such a power, be the most irrational and inconsistent being, and by consequence the most imperfect understanding being which can be conceived. ”