Summary

Portrait of Albert Taylor Bledsoe Albert Taylor Bledsoe An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will

What a wound is thus given to the cause of free-agency and accountability! What scope is thus allowed for the sophistry of the passions! Every man who can persuade himself that his appetites, his desires, or his passions, have been too strong for him, may blind his mind to a sense of his guilt, and lull his conscience into a fatal repose.
The necessitarian, like a skilful general, is not slow to attack this weak point in the philosophy of free-agency. If our emotions operate to produce volition, says he, then the strongest must prevail; to say otherwise, is to say that it is not the strongest.
Source: Gutenberg

Portrait of Albert Taylor Bledsoe Albert Taylor Bledsoe An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will

Passion is not “the gale,” it is “the card.” Reason is not the force, it is the law. All the power resides in the free, untrammelled will. He who overlooks this, and blindly seeks for something to “move the mind to volition,” loses sight of the grand and distinctive peculiarity of man’s nature, and brings it down to the dust, subjecting it to the laws of matter and to bondage.
We do not allow Mr. Hobbes to declare our idea of a free-agent, as “one that, when all the circumstances necessary to produce action are present, can nevertheless not act;”
Source: Gutenberg

Portrait of Albert Taylor Bledsoe Albert Taylor Bledsoe An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will

To say that we are under a natural necessity, then, is only to say that our power is limited, and not that it is not free. It is reserved for moral necessity—shall I say to enslave?—no, but to annihilate the will.
It is true, if we will to do a thing, and are restrained from doing it by a superior force, we are not to blame for not doing it; or if we refuse to do it, and are constrained to do it, we are equally blameless. In such cases, natural necessity, although it does not reach the will, is an excuse for external conduct. If the question were, is a man accountable for his external actions?
Source: Gutenberg

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