Charles Carroll Everett

“ It finds only contradiction. As, however, it rises to the real assertion of itself, as it claims that inheritance which it feels really belongs to it, it finds the limits give way. They seem, for the moment, to fall off from it. As soon, however, as it has tasted the joy of freedom, it finds itself again oppressed. The limit has been only pushed to a little greater distance, but it is there, as real and as solid as at the first. ”

“ Man feels within himself the power to accomplish this end which his nature demands; he often feels, indeed, that he is accomplishing it. He feels that the barriers are moving before him, that the area of his freedom is becoming enlarged, that he is thus pressing into the infinite. ”

“ The reconciliation is found in the fact that, while the limitation must be assumed by and for the sake of the intelligence, as a reality, absolute freedom from limit exists as a postulate. This postulate is always accomplishing itself, though it is never accomplished.
Man feels that his destiny is to be wholly independent of that which is foreign to himself. The end and aim of his existence is thus to assert himself in the face of that outward universe which is, on its part, also self-asserting, and which is always invading the realm of the absolute personality. ”

“ The I feels its limit because it presses beyond it; and it presses beyond the limit because it divines something to which it has not yet fully attained. For these results, are needed different forms of activity that can be compared between themselves, and some basis or standard for this comparison. In order to make the discussion more easily understood, we should, perhaps, define more carefully the terms used. We have to ask, then, What is meant by the limit with which the I finds itself confronted? The limit is the world of objects within which the soul seems to be inclosed. ”

“ That our knowledge of the outward world should be dependent upon our own activity, and yet more directly upon the fact that we have an ideal with which to compare the outward fact, may seem one of the most extravagant utterances of Fichte—one of the most extravagant, because it concerns that which is so familiar in our lives that its extravagance may be distinctly seen, while other statements may have seemed so far away and vague that their extravagance is hardly noticed. ”

“ If we recognize, however, as has been done in the discussion that we have just followed, the fact that the positing of its environment by the I is dependent upon its striving to realize something which is as yet, and may always be, beyond its reach; if we realize that without this ideal there would be for us no real; without this striving, no object; the whole aspect of things changes. There is introduced the element of freedom. Freedom becomes, indeed, the basis and the goal of all activity. ”

“ Yet further it is true that we receive our most vivid, if not, indeed, our only real, notion of the actual existence of the things that surround us, from the resistance which they offer to our attempts to modify them. When we undertake to do this, we are confronted by the unyielding nature of our environment. We are continually finding ourselves face to face with some obstacle which is either immovable or can be moved with difficulty. We can here apply literally Fichte’s formula; namely, that only through the ideal do we reach the knowledge of the real. ”

“ The sense of limit cannot be aroused without some means of comparison, by which the activity that is checked at the boundary that has been referred to, shall be seen to be inadequate to manifest the real nature of the I. Without some such comparison, the I might be seen by some spectator from the outside to be limited, but it would not itself recognize the limit. In fact, we never feel a limit which belongs to the constitution of our nature. No man feels, for instance, the limitation of his own judgment. ”

“ That is the reality, upon which the soul is dependent. The soul is the wax, the outward world is the seal: or at best the soul is the instrument which the stroke of the outward world smites into music. With Fichte, all this is different. The soul, or the I, is pure activity. It is nothing save by its own act. Its very being is the positing of itself; thus, through this act alone, it has being. Through this activity, it recognizes also the object. If it were not for this infinite activity, there would be to it no object. ”

“ Two elements that we know simply as different, cannot be harmonized. We know too little of them and of their relation to one another to know where to look for any principle of harmony. When, however, we have brought them into the relation of a direct antithesis, then we see that our knowledge of this relation is complete and final. We know just where to seek for the principle of unity. Moreover, we have at least an indication of the nature of this unity. ”

“ By this reasoning, in which I have assumed certain views to be commonly held, and have not advanced them as those which I should maintain without qualification, we have seen that our recognition of the reality of the external world may be shown to be dependent upon the ideals according to which we shape our action. We may take a step further, and affirm that it is through our own impulse to activity, and thus mediately through the ideal which is the source of this impulse, that we recognize the reality of the objects by which we are directly surrounded. ”

“ We are here met by a contradiction. This infinite striving, which has been spoken of because it is a striving, is related to an object. It seeks to accomplish something, and its object is that which it seeks to accomplish. We have, then, two objective activities, one infinite and the other finite. The very statement is contradictory; for an infinite objective activity is inconceivable. We have, then, to ask, How can we conceive of an infinite objective activity? ”

“ It compares with its own ideal the actual reality that surrounds it, and demands that this reality conform to it. Its ideal, being an object, is, so far as its form is concerned, foreign to itself; but, so far as its content is concerned, it is one with itself. This ideal, as a mirror, reflects the I; so that, when the I surveys it, it contemplates itself. The I would have the real objective world also as its mirror, so that it may find itself in this as well as in its ideal. This is the demand which it makes of the universe. It is a demand which it makes without reason or justification. ”

“ All is dynamic. All manifests the play of the infinite life, which alone is. At the same time, although Fichte himself uses, to some extent, the kind of illustration just indicated, this does not fairly represent his own inmost thought. Really the only activity of the I, which he recognizes, is that of positing. The only field which is open to our thought, as we study his system, is that of consciousness. The absolute activity of the I is that of self-recognition. ”

“ We find, manifested by it, a striving toward that which cannot be reached. The only relation of the pure activity of the I to any possible object, is, then, a striving, and, according to what we have already seen, an infinite striving. This infinite striving is the condition of the possibility of the recognition of the objective world. If there were no striving, there would be no object. ”

“ The impulse to activity postulates the reality of the objects upon which we are moved to act. If we were surrounded by what we knew to be phantasms of our own brain, we certainly would not use physical powers to rid ourselves of the annoying presence. We are so constituted as to be ever active. We have ideals which we are impelled to accomplish. In Fichte’s very interesting work on the Vocation of Man, and, indeed, in his ethical writings generally, he shows how our belief in the outward world is the postulate of our active impulse. ”

“ The world changes about us. First one object of the environment, and then another, affects us. Sounds, colors, forms, are ever varying. The world is a kaleidoscope which is always turning; and the transformations thus produced are sufficient to awaken our consciousness, and to give to it a content, without reference to that ideal which Fichte makes essential to any consciousness of the objective world. ”

“ It is at the same time infinite; for in the case of the ideal object, the limit is wholly dependent upon the I. The I recognizes no condition, except that it must set a limit somewhere; but it can press this limit into the infinite as it will. The ideal involves, at every moment, a limit; but this limit must change every moment. The absolute striving is infinite; but, as such, it never comes to consciousness; for consciousness implies reflection, and reflection implies determination. So soon as this activity comes to consciousness, it becomes finite. ”

“ The contradiction cannot be removed, except in a completed eternity. If the object should ever be thus pushed to infinity, it would be no longer an object. The idea of infinitude would be realized, which is a contradiction.
The idea of such an infinity which is to be accomplished by us, does, in spite of its unattainableness, hover before us. It is bound up in our very being. We must solve the contradiction, although we cannot conceive its solution to be possible, and though we foresee that in no moment of eternity can we conceive it to be possible. ”

“ The way in which the results of Fichte give completeness to those of Kant may be illustrated by the part which belief in immortality plays in each system. Immortality is demanded by Kant in order that some power, apparently outside both of man and his surroundings, should accomplish a relation between man and his environment which neither man nor the nature of things could bring about. Immortality is thus postulated as something which might be supposed to be foreign to man’s nature, and which is provided in order to give space for the working of a power also foreign. ”

“ The antinomy which plays so important a part in the system of Fichte rests also upon a psychological basis. The one side represents the practical reason, the activity of the ego, which presses into the infinite. The other side rests upon the theoretical reason. Intelligence and consciousness under any form are inconceivable without some limit. We have thus the infinite I and the finite I. face to face. The one will assert itself, and will, therefore, be absolute. The other will be intelligent and self-conscious, and must, therefore, be limited. ”

“ So far as the understanding is viewed in relation to empirical results, its world is too small for the reason; but when the measureless sweep of its Categories is considered—the endless regressus on the line of Causation, the analysis that can find no point of rest—the world of the understanding is found to be too vast for the architectural unity which the reason demands. ”

“ Kant, as we have already seen, while denying the validity of the Category of Causation except as connecting phenomena among themselves, assumes the Thing-in-itself as the ground or cause of phenomena. Fichte recognizes both sides of the contradiction. He sees that the mind goes beyond its right in assuming anything outside itself, yet that it is by its nature forced to do this. He is content to let the matter remain thus, and to find a solution of the antinomy only in a postulate that can never be fully satisfied. ”

“ From the point which we have reached, another characteristic of Fichte’s philosophy becomes more distinctly seen than was possible before. The system recognizes nothing but activity. It is purely dynamic. Further, this activity is purely of the spirit. According to the ordinary view of the world, the spirit is largely passive. It finds itself in the midst of a thousand objects which force themselves upon it. They invade it, they control it, they impress themselves upon it ”

“ If we have found that X and Y stand in a relation of polarity to one another—that is, a relation of direct and absolute antithesis, so that the one is simply the opposite of the other—then we know that the one is absolutely dependent upon the other. When we have reached this point of absolute divergence, so that unity seems impossible, all at once the unity is reached. ”

“ We should here have the basis of that form of fatalism which may be represented by the system of Spinoza. [6] This system Fichte considers to have been, before the critical philosophy, the most self-consistent system possible in regard to the human will. According to this, we should recognize in finite beings, no more activity than is manifested by them. There could be no infinite power of activity, because no such pure activity manifests itself. According to this view, finite beings would be wholly finite. ”

“ The only reason is that this demand springs from its essential being, and it cannot go behind that. When we prove anything, we simply bring the statement we would prove, to the test of the fundamental law of our own nature; and this demand that the outward should correspond to the inner, this demand on the part of the I for absolute independence and self-assertion, is that fundamental nature which furnishes the test for all else, but which itself is absolute, admitting of proof or justification as little as it admits of disproof or confutation. ”

“ Here we see how our purpose outruns our performance, and thus shows us the limits within which we are confined, which otherwise would not be perceived by us. Thus it is to a sturdy, active nature that the world seems most real. ”