In Ethics — Chapter III, G. E. Moore examines the nature of moral judgment, challenging the idea that statements about right or wrong are simply expressions of personal or societal emotions. He maintains that such claims suggest the existence of objective moral facts, rather than mere subjective views, and rejects theories that allow an action to be both right and wrong.
By analyzing moral approval, disapproval, and social viewpoints, Moore argues that ethical discussion must be based on an objective foundation, insisting that variations in opinion do not eliminate the possibility of universal moral standards. His chapter reinforces the need to establish ethics on principles that go beyond fleeting emotional reactions.
G. E. Moore,
Ethics — Chapter III
(1912)
“ For if, whenever we assert an action to be right or wrong, we were merely making an assertion about some man’s feelings or opinions, it would be incredible we should be so mistaken as to our own meaning, as to think that a question of right or wrong cannot be absolutely settled by showing what men feel and think, and to think that an action cannot be both right and wrong. ”
G. E. Moore,
Ethics — Chapter III
(1912)
“ Different views may, of course, be taken as to what the feeling is which we are supposed to assert that we have. Some people might say that, when we call an action right, we are merely asserting that we like it or are pleased with it; and that when we call one wrong, we are merely asserting that we dislike it or are displeased with it. Others might say, more plausibly, that it is not mere liking and dislike that we express by these judgments, but a peculiar sort of liking and dislike, which might perhaps be called a feeling of moral approval and of moral disapproval. ”
G. E. Moore,
Ethics — Chapter III
(1912)
“ Whenever we make any assertion whatever (unless we do not mean what we say) we are always expressing one or other of two things—namely, either that we think the thing in question to be so or that we know it to be so. ”
