Summary

A. K. Rogers. Philosophical Review Volume 29 Number 6 (1920)

To grow is certainly highly to be desired. But to make the inner process of growth itself the professed object of our ambition is precisely the dubious point in the ideal. It assumes that the most interesting thing in the universe is oneself—a natural supposition which experience may be expected to dispose us to find questionable. There is a vast difference between taking a wide interest in things because they are interesting, and taking a wide interest because the interests are ours, and what we have in view is to develop our capacities.
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A. K. Rogers. Philosophical Review Volume 29 Number 6 (1920)

Take any formula that has been proposed as a starting-point for ethics—the proposition that we ought to be reasonable, or that we ought to lead a unified life, or that we ought to work for the general good. Of each of these, as purely intellectual propositions, it is legitimate to ask the question, Why ought we? We reach no resting place till we get hold of something that is not a rational intuition, or a principle, but a fact.
Source: Wikisource

A. K. Rogers. Philosophical Review Volume 29 Number 6 (1920)

Such an insistence on individual liking as the primary determinant of the personal ideal, as against an appeal to objective and absolute standards, will doubtless seem to some too little strenuous, and too indifferent to the lofty character of duty and the dominant claims of the good. It is always possible to bring about in oneself a feeling of unworthiness by contrasting the needs of the world with the actual achievements of any individual life, and so to leave an uneasy sense that we have no right to insist upon personal claims to satisfaction.
Source: Wikisource

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