David Hume

“ Fact, matter of—truth=agreement 'to real relations of ideas or to real existence and matter of fact,' 458; understanding either compares ideas or infers matters of fact: its objects either relations of objects or matters of fact, 463 (cf. 413) ; (cf. Cause, § 7) ; morality does not consist in any matter of fact which can be discovered by the understanding, 468; when you look for the morality of an act, you can only find approbation or disapprobation in yourself: 'here is matter of fact, but it is the object of feeling, not of reason,' 469. ”

“ Philosophy, whose errors are only ridiculous and whose extravagances do not influence our lives, 271; all we want is a satisfactory set of opinions, and we are most likely to get them by studying human nature, 272 ”

“ This inference or transition from impression to idea does not arise from experience through reason, for that would require the principle of the uniformity of nature, viz. that the future will resemble the past, which is provable neither demonstratively, 89, nor probably, for probable reasoning itself assumes the principle, 89 (cf. 104, 105, 134) ; nor can we justify the inference by arguments from production, power, or efficacy: such arguments either circular or have no end 90 (cf. 632) . ”

“ Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice? 498; interest the natural obligation to justice, the sentiment of right and wrong the moral obligation, 498; by sympathy we take a general survey, and perceive that injustice always brings uneasiness, hence the sense of moral good and evil follows upon injustice, 499; 'self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue,' 500 ”

“ In plants and animals we suppose 'a sympathy of parts to a common end,' and 'suppose that they bear each other the reciprocal relation of cause and effect,' 259; the mind a system of different perceptions which mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another, 261; the notion of causation or a chain of causes which gives rise to personal identity derived from memory, 261 ”

“ A perception can very well be separate from the mind, since the mind is only 'a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations,' 207; our resembling impressions are not really identical nor their existence continued, 210; 'all our perceptions may exist separately and have no need of anything to support their existence, 233, 633; all particular perceptions may exist separately and so are not necessarily related to a self or person, 252; when we look intimately into ourselves we never can find anything but some particular perceptions, 252, 456, 634 ”

“ Confusion between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 407 (cf. 609) ; (2) a false sensation or experience of the liberty of indifference: the necessity of an action is not a quality in the agent but in the spectator (cf. 165) : and liberty is only an absence of determination in the spectator's mind, and=indifference, which is often felt by the agent but seldom by the spectator, 408; false experiment on part of agent to prove his liberty, 408; a spectator can generally infer our actions from our motives and character, and when he cannot it is due to his ignorance. ”

“ Vivacity—alone distinguishes impressions from ideas, 1 (cf. 319) ; vagueness of the term 105 cf. 629; communicated by an impression to its related idea, 98 f., 119; and unphilosophical probability, 144; every kind of opinion or judgment which amounts not to knowledge is derived entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and these qualities constitute in the mind what we call the belief of the existence of any object, 153 (v. Cause, § 7) ; of our ideas or imagination the basis of all assent, and the foundation of the senses, memory, and understanding, 165 ”

“ All perceptions except those of sight and touch 'exist and yet are nowhere,' i.e. are neither figured nor extended and have no place, 236; perceptions do not exist like mathematical points, 239; extension a quality of perception, i.e. some perceptions are themselves extended. ”

“ Inhesion—no idea of substance or inhesion, 234.
Instinct—'reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which arises from past experience' 179; as opposed to reflection=imagination as opposed to reason, 215; benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, instincts originally implanted in our natures, 417; the mind by an original instinct seeks to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil, 438; direct passions often arise from an unaccountable instinct, 439. ”

“ The indirect passions (v. Pride) . Conversion of the idea of a passion into the very passion itself by sympathy (q.v.) 319 (cf. 576) ; association of ideas can never give rise to any passion, 305-6; law of the transition of passions opposed to that of the imagination and ideas, since passions pass most easily from strong to weak, 341-2; in case of conflict the law of the passions prevails over that of the imagination, 344-5, but its scope is less, since passions are associated only by resemblance, 343: passions 'susceptible of an entire union,' 366 (cf. 441) ”

“ Is found in all men, and is the source of uniformity of temper in men of the same nation, 317; assists love and hatred, 349; a cause of love of relations, and acquaintance, because by it we are supplied with lively ideas, and every lively idea is agreeable, 353; with others, is agreeable only 'by giving an emotion to the spirits,' 354; the chief cause of our esteem for the rich, which is often disinterested, 358, 361, 616; observable through whole animal creation, 363, 398; especially in man, who can form no wish which has not a reference to society, 363 ”

“ Two great principles of all arguments from causation. (a) no object in itself can afford a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it, (b) constant conjunction of objects affords us no reason for drawing an inference concerning any objects beyond those of which we have experience, 139; the belief that a certain future event will occur derived from an operation of the fancy which extracts from the balance of experiments a single lively idea, 140 ”

“ God—as prime mover, 159; idea oil derived from an impression, 160; the doctrine of an immaterial thinking substance leads necessarily to Atheism just as Spinoza'a system does, 240 f.; the idea of God derived from particular impressions, none of which contain any efficacy nor seem to have any connexion with any other existence, and so we can have no idea of the efficacy of God as a cause, 248; to regard God as the efficacious principle which supplies the deficiency of all causes is to make him the author of all our perceptions and volitions, good and bad, 249 ”

“ The vulgar definition of justice, 'a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due,' supposes right and property independent of justice, which is absurd, 526-7; justice and injustice do not admit of gradations, therefore not naturally either virtuous or vicious, since 'all natural qualities run insensibly into each other,' 530; the laws of being universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be derived from nature, 532; government required to enforce justice, 535-538 ”

“ Intuition—a source of knowledge and certainty, perceiving three out of four demonstrable relations, viz., resemblance, contrariety, and degree in any quality, 70; does not inform us of necessity of a cause to a beginning of existence, 79.
Joy—and pride, 190; a mixture of, with grief produces hope and fear, 441 f.
Judgment.
⁠§ 1. Does not necessarily imply union of two ideas, 96 n: only a form of conception, 'we can form a proposition which contains only one idea,' 97 n; judgments are 'perceptions,' 456; only judgments can be unreasonable, not passions or actions, 416, 459 ”

“ Identity, § 4) ; as a matter of fact the senses only present impressions as external to our body, which is not the same as external to ourselves, 191; again sight does not really inform us of distance or outness, but reason, 191; three kinds of impressions conveyed by, 192 (v. Impressions) ; so far as the senses are judges all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence, 193; 'founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas,' 265 ”

“ A. Relations a class of complex ideas produced by association, 13; defined and divided into philosophical and natural, 14 (cf. 94, 69, 170) ; seven sources of philosophical relation, 14; physiological explanation of, 60; of causation, an impression of reflection, 165; perfect, between two objects implies a 'vibration of imagination,' i.e. an equal ease in passing from either to the other, 355; contiguity, succession, and resemblance independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168; impossible to found a relation except on some common quality, 236. ”

“ Passions praised and blamed according as they are exercised with their natural and usual force, 483; our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course ofonr passions, 484; in the condition of man before society, selfishness and partiality are the usual passions and therefore praiseworthy, 488; 'every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions,' 488; a natural passion or inclination towards an act constitutes a natural obligation to do it, 518; 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions,' 532 ”

“ Punishment—can only be justified by doctrine of necessity, 411.
Quality—a source of relation, 15; degree in a demonstrable relation perceived by intuition, 70, 464; power, and necessity, and extension, qualities of perceptions, 166 f., 239; unknown qualities possible, 168 (cf. 172) ; our idea of a body, a collection of ideas of sensible qualities, 219; 'every quality, being a distinct thing from another, may be conceived to exist apart and may exist apart not only from every other quality but from that unintelligible chimaera of a substance,' 222; fiction of occult quality, 224 ”

“ Virtue-power of our mental qualities to produce pride and love, 575; why the same qualities in all cases produce both pride and love, humility and hatred, 589; we praise all passions which partake of love, e.g. benevolence, because love is immediately agreeable to the person actuated by it, 604; and because the transition from love to love is peculiarly easy, 605; praise and blame a fainter love and hatred, 614 ”

“ Atheism—Spinoza's, the same as the doctrine of the immateriality, indivisibility, and simplicity of a thinking substance, 240 f., 244.
Attraction—mental, compared to natural: its causes inexplicable, 13.
Barrow—cit. 46.
Beauty—pleasure not only its necessary attendant, but its essence: nothing but a form which produces pleasure, 299; natural and moral, 300; can there be a right or a wrong taste in beauty? 547 n: involuntary, 608; derived from sympathy, 364; sense of, produced by sympathy with the pleasure of a possessor in his possession: hence we find beauty in every thing useful, 576 ”

“ Between the sexes, derived from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, 394; produces the first rudiments of society, 486.
⁠§ 5. Self-love not love in proper sense, 329; self-love the source of all injustice, 480; 'no such passion in human minds as love of mankind merely as such,' 481; 'man in general' or human nature the object but not the cause of love, 482; a social passion, 491; dejects the soul like humility, 391; love and hatred of animals, 397 ”

“ How the rules of justice and property are established by the artifice of man, 484 f.; though society increases man's power, ability, and security, 485, yet in a savage state he is not sensible of this, and so cannot produce society: but the natural appetite between the sexes and concern for common offspring makes the first beginning, 486; both the natural temper and outward circumstances of man adverse to society, viz. ”

“ Doctrine of necessity not only harmless to morality but essential to it, 409-412 (cf. 375) (v. Necessity, Will) ; moral philosophy, 175, 282; abstruse speculations in morals carry conviction owing to the interest of the subject, 453.
Moral and natural—beauty, 300; evidence, 404, 406; obligation, 545 (v. Natural) .
Moral and physical, 171.
Moral obligation, 517, 525, 547, 569 (v. Obligation) .
Motion—Cartesian theory of God as prime mover, 159; cannot be real if we accept the modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 128 f.; or matter, the cause of our perceptions, 246 f. ”

“ Taste—the only judge of wit, 297; can there be a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty? 541 n.
Theologians—their doctrine of a thinking substance a true atheism, and the same as Spinoza's, 240 f; their system and Spinoza's have all their absurdities in common, 243.
Thought (v. Mind, Matter) —its relation to extension, 234 f.; the materialists wrong who conjoin all thought with extension, 235 ”