James Frederick Ferrier

“ All the regions of literature were spread out before his view; all the avenues of science stood open at his command. A simpler and a grander nature never arose out of darkness into human life: a truer and a manlier character God never made. How plain, and yet how polished was his life, in all its ways—how refined, yet how robust and broad his intelligence, in all its workings. ”

“ Such certainly is the wish and the desire of the patrons of the University of Edinburgh. They are of opinion that no man except the thorough-going disciples of Reid, and Stewart, and Hamilton, ought to get a hearing from our Chairs, and that philosophy has reached its final close, its ultimate development in them. Alas for philosophy if this were so! But philosophy has not come, and never will come, to any such pass. Human reason is stronger than municipal restrictions, and truth will force her way, and hold her ground, in the face of municipal patronage. ”

“ I answer, by the necessity of thinking—that is the necessity by which nonsense cannot fill the universe. Sheer nonsense and absurdity cannot be either known or conceived, by any intelligence, to fill the universe, and therefore they do not fill it. I am as much entitled to argue from knowledge to existence as any other philosopher is. ”

“ Therefore, the mere material world, has no real and absolute existence. But neither is it a nonentity (I am no idealist) , for there is no nonentity, any more than there is entity out of relation to all intelligence. It is simply an expression of nonsense. That is my reasoning, and if any one can propose an amendment on the syllogism, I shall very willingly receive it. Of course it requires much explanation, which is abundantly supplied in the Institutes, to render it perfectly clear and convincing. Its conclusion is not my conclusion, more than it is any other man's conclusion. ”

“ What would be thought of a naturalist, were he, in composing a treatise on fishes, first of all, to set about proving to himself and others that there were such creatures? Would he not be thought rather a natural than a naturalist? Such very reasonably might I have been thought, if I had ever dreamt of proving to the world, either that Knowledge was, or that Being was. ”

“ But I maintain that Hamilton in his argument against the idealists, must be held to assert (when his argument is drawn fully out) that matter is a separate unit of knowledge, and that upon this ground, and upon it alone, can he contend that it is a separate unit of existence: for what conclusiveness would there be in saying, matter is no separate unit of cognition, therefore it is a separate unit of existence; in other, and plainer, words,—matter is never known to have an independent existence, therefore it has an independent existence. ”

“ This is one very fundamental point of difference between the old and the new Scottish system of metaphysics; and am not at all ashamed to confess it.
The first truths of the old Scottish school have not only no value in philosophy, they have no value in any intellectual market in the world. They possess no exchangeable worth: they are positively not vendible; yet, Dr Reid and his successors have been in the habit of charging their students for them, at the rate of three guineas ahead, and of doing this while all the rest of the world was obtaining them in unlimited abundance for nothing. ”

“ Does it disprove the legitimacy of maintaining that there are such laws? To come nearer to the point: because human knowledge explodes, in some instances, in contradictions, is that any reason for denying the truth of the assertion, that "every intelligence must be cognizant of itself, when it is cognizant of any thing else?" (proposition first of the Institutes, and the principle from which the whole subsequent deductions proceed.) Surely there is no force in such reasoning. ”

“ So, in regard to real existence. No man in his senses would require a proof that it is. But a man might very naturally be curious to know what it is. Is real existence mind without matter, or is it matter without mind? Is it thought apart from an intelligent basis—or an intelligent basis apart from all thought? in other words, is real existence any of these items strictly by themselves, and, either actually or possibly, divorced from all relation to one another? Or again, is real existence, mind in union with things or thoughts? Is it matter or something else in connection with intelligence? ”

“ So in philosophy, no man can be called a philosopher who merely knows and says, that he and other people exist, that there is an external world, that a man is the same person to day that he was yesterday, and so forth. These are undoubtedly truths, but I maintain that they are not truths in philosophy, any more than those others just mentioned, are truths in chemistry. Our old Scottish school, however, is of a different way of thinking. It represents these and similar facts as the first truths of philosophy, and to these it has recourse in handling the deeper questions of metaphysics. ”

“ Still harping on this point he again says:—"Mr Ferrier only gains an apparent triumph, by making the mind, which is an inward object in perception, a part of the material or outward object; by which confusion alone, he can affirm that matter existing without the mind—that is, without a part of itself—is a contradiction." I answer that I gain a real triumph, by doing exactly the reverse of this, namely, by not "making the mind, which is an inward object in perception, a part of the material or outward object;" ”

“ Can we not admit that man's reason is imperfect, and, in reference to some questions, impotent, and yet stop short of the conclusion that in no respect whatever is it akin to a higher order of intelligence, supposing such to exist? ”

“ I have preserved this distinction sufficiently, although, in the Institutes, I have dwelt principally on the object of knowledge (the cognitum) as that which, above all things, required to be distinctly ascertained and fully explained—so confusedly had it been expounded, if not completely misapprehended in our antecedent psychology. The distinction is this, and it is a very simple one: the object of knowledge—of course the true and total object—is always the union of subject and object (subject + object) . The act of knowledge is the apprehension of this synthesis by the subject. ”

“ Mr Cairns proceeds, in his attempt, to show the invalidity of my theistic argument. He says, "Why, since finite intelligence begins in time to redeem the universe from contradiction, may not this be the whole rescue?" I answer, simply because we are prevented, by a necessity of thinking, from conceiving it to be the whole rescue. We cannot suppose a time when time itself, and every thing else, was in a condition of absolute nonsense, and therefore we must suppose something more than finite intelligence to rescue the universe from contradiction ”

“ The fundamental assumption on which my system proceeds is the legitimacy of extending to all knowledge and all reason certain necessary laws of our knowledge and our reason. Mr Fraser refuses to grant this postulate: and on the ground of this refusal he breaks down my system. But there is no great triumph in that. It was already done to his hand in the very book he was reviewing. I have proclaimed, in the most explicit terms, that unless this assumption be conceded, my system cannot work—cannot stand good for an instant. ”

“ Logic sometimes signifies the theory of reasoning (as part, at least, of its province) , and sometimes it signifies reasoning itself. Metaphysics is the science of real existence. The former is a science of the abstract—the latter of the concrete. Now, when Mr Cairns states that I confound logic and metaphysics, I am at a loss to know whether he means that I confound metaphysics with the theory of reasoning, or with reasoning itself. He probably means the latter; because he alleges that I "endeavour to reach real existence by formal demonstration." ”

“ Before concluding my examination of these six results, have just one remark to add in reference to my theology, as represented by Mr Cairns. He says, "This Deity is not independent; for the universe in the synthesis of self and not self—on the whole principles of this system—is as necessary to Him, as He to it—not certainly in a material form, but in some form which constitutes an eternal but varying non-ego or particular element, in his consciousness." ”

“ Philosophy is not traditional. As a mere inheritance it carries no benefit to either man or boy. The more it is a received dogmatic, the less is it a quickening process. But without pursuing that subject any farther, I shall take permission to say, that in my humble opinion the patrons had no right to decide the late election on any other grounds than those of evidence. ”

“ The conclusions of a demonstrated philosophy are no more the peculiar opinions of an individual thinker, than the muscles of the human body are the peculiar muscles of an individual anatomist.
In the passage in his pamphlet, bearing on what he calls this second result of my system, Mr Cairns says,—"Professor Ferrier's attempt to put the mind outside, as a part of the external object of perception, is a mere confusion of his own." ”

“ My reviewer, however, professes himself unable to comprehend any distinction between subject and object, except that the one is that which knows, and the other is that which is known. He professes himself unable to understand, or to admit, that the mind should be that which both knows and is known, while matter is that which is only known. ”

“ This happens when, all the ordinary influences by which such contests are usually determined having become subordinate, the turning-point on which the election has come to hinge, is seen to be a principle which must impede the advancement, if it does not imperil the existence, of science. An occurrence of this kind is an infinitely worse evil than the bestowal of a Chair on an inferior candidate, through the incompetent judgment of the electors, or through the corrupt motives of private friendship or sectarian preference. ”

“ The tenure by which they hold office gave them no more right to require that the Professor of Metaphysics in Edinburgh should adopt the systems of Reid or of Stewart or of Hamilton, than it empowered them to enact that he should teach the transmigration of souls, or believe in the vortices of Des Cartes. It gave them no right whatever to determine that the standards of these thinkers were to be accepted as the fundamental articles of all sound metaphysical faith, and that no man should obtain the vacant Chair unless he were prepared to subscribe this confession. ”

“ Hegel has written a metaphysical work, which he calls logic. Hence, argues Mr Cairns, the metaphysics of Professor Ferrier, who is obviously a Hegelian, must be identical with logic. Hegel makes no distinction between logic and metaphysics—therefore Ferrier makes none. But I have shown that I am no follower of Hegel. I cannot follow what I do not understand; therefore I have imported none of the opinions of that philosopher, and least of all do I agree with him in confounding logic and metaphysics. ”

“ He adds, "out of this truism, even out of the most fertile truth, to evolve all other, is an assumption which philosophy does not warrant, and which experience has hitherto shown to be too great for the human faculties." ”

“ His implied argument, then, is this: human reason explodes in contradictions, in other words, is nonplused between two contradictory propositions, when it pursues the consideration of such themes as space and time. Therefore all reason must explode in like contradictions, must be baffled in a similar way, if we hold that there is any analogy, any point in common between our and all other orders of intelligence, or that there are any laws binding on reason and knowledge universally. ”

“ Perhaps the Town Council may argue that the principle on which they grounded their decision was scarcely so strong or so patent as has been now represented—that in their attempt to judge of the conflict among philosophers, and to balance the claims of contending theories, they got bewildered, that in these circumstances they conceived their safest course would be to hold as authoritative the names best known in our philosophy, and to give their preference to the candidate who pinned himself most faithfully to these. ”

“ And just consider what the effect would be if this same test were laid down in all scientific departments! Would any man devote himself to the active prosecution of science, if he knew that by doing so he must inevitably forfeit what to him may be an object of desire or ambition? ”

“ In other words, mind, together with something (whatever it may be, for this I never undertake to settle) which is not mind, so strictly as mind itself is mind—this, with me, as I have already said, is alone Absolute Existence. This is what absolutely and truly exists. It is always a concrete and not an abstract. Mr Cairns is quite right here. But there is a slight suppressio veri in the statement, where he says that my system "leaves everything in the realm of Being beyond the relation of knowledge, a contradiction. ”

“ By what tortuous process of ingenuity can the argument proving the Divine omniscience, be held equivalent to an argument disproving the Divine omnipotence? So far from being equivalent to this, the latter conclusion follows as a necessary corollary from the former. It is impossible for a Being to be omniscient, without being also omnipotent and the first great cause. No one infinite attribute is compatible with any finite attributes. That is certain. But my system is not a treatise on natural theology ”

“ Mr Cairns says, in his second pamphlet ("The Scottish Philosophy") , "The two foundation principles of the Hegelian philosophy, according to Mr Morell, viz., the identity of thought and existence, and the union of two contradictories in all knowledge, I have incidentally pointed out in Professor Ferrier's system." I have stated distinctly in the Institutes (prop. vi., obs. 10) , that to demonstrate the equation (not the identity, as Mr Cairns expresses it) of Knowing and Being—the known and the existent—is the highest office of philosophy; that to do this is to reach the truth. ”

“ A few might—a few with whom the pure love of truth is greater than the love of worldly place, and who are willing to suffer the penalty incident to superior insight. But we may depend upon it, that it is a bad social symptom, when a man's labours and proficiency in any particular line of business, are quoted against him as positive disqualifications for the office. In the long run, it will be found, that the opposite system affords fully more encouragement to science. ”