New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

“ Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) , to determine that a reasonable jury could not find statements at issue in this libel case to have been made with actual malice where defendant journalists relied upon (i) prior judicial rulings, affidavits and previously published articles and (ii) extensive interviewing of participants in the events described, when plaintiff repeatedly refused to discuss the statements it later claimed to be false and defamatory.
2. ”

“ However, I dissent from those portions of the opinions in this case and No. 118 which would permit these libel cases to be tried again under a different set of jury instructions. As I have stated before, ' (I) t is time for this Court to abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and adopt the rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments.' Curtis Publishing Co. ”

“ The First Amendment limits California's libel law in various respects. When, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice, i.e., with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) . Mere negligence does not suffice. ”

“ Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, concurs in the judgment of the Court for the reasons set out in Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293, 84 S.Ct. ”

“ Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. Plainly the Alabama law of civil libel is
a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70.
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth. ”

“ Thus, the trial judge here instructed the jury that
mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice, in fact, and does not justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an action for libel. The court refused, however, to give the following instruction which had been requested by the Times:
I charge you . . . that punitive damages, as the name indicates, are designed to punish the defendant, the New York Times Company, a corporation, and the other defendants in this case, . . . ”

“ As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual malice. The statement by the Times' Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation, he thought the advertisement was "substantially correct," affords no constitutional warrant for the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that it was a
cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement [from which] the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its maliciousness inferable therefrom. The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the publication ”

“ The Times states that four other libel suits based on the advertisement have been filed against it by others who have served as Montgomery City Commissioners and by the Governor of Alabama; that another $500,000 verdict has been awarded in the only one of these cases that has yet gone to trial, and that the damages sought in the other three total $2,000,000.
↑ . Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error." ”

“ But the Court was careful to note that it "retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel"; for "public men are, as it were, public property," and "discussion cannot be denied, and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." Id. at 263-264, and n. 18. In the only previous case that did present the question of constitutional limitations upon the power to award damages for libel of a public official, the Court was equally divided and the question was not decided. ”

“ Applying these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing [p286] clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law. The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming that they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on the advertisement, there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard. ”

“ We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made "of and concerning" respondent. Respondent relies on the words of the advertisement and the testimony of six witnesses to establish a connection between it and himself. Thus, in his brief to this Court, he states:
The reference to respondent as police commissioner is clear from the ad. In addition, the jury heard the testimony of a newspaper editor . . . ; a real estate and insurance man . . . ”

“ Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A. 6th Cir. 1893) ; see also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col.L.Rev. 875, 892 (1949) . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." ”

“ It rejected petitioners' constitutional contentions with the brief statements that "The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications," and "The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action, and not private action." Id. at 676, 144 So.2d at 40.
Because of the importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted the separate petitions for certiorari of the individual petitioners and of the Times. 371 U.S. 946. We reverse the judgment. ”

“ In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of [p282] public concern, public men, and candidates for office. 78 Kan. at 723, 98 P. at 285.
Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct [21] is appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued for libel by a private citizen. ”

“ Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297, 84 S.Ct. 710, 735, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, I expressed my conviction 'that the Constitution accords citizens and press an unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct.' Id., at 305, 84 S.Ct. at 739. New York Times was a civil libel case; this is a criminal libel prosecution. In my view, ' (i) f the rule that libel on government has no place in our Constitution is to have real meaning, then libel (criminal or civil) on the official conduct of the governors likewise can have no place in our Constitution.' Id., at 299, 84 S.Ct., at 736. ”

“ Yet such has been, in great degree, the case, and the name of Sullivan occupies a lesser space in the history of the Revolutionary struggle, than those of many others whose achievements fell far short of his in magnitude and importance. Sullivan has been made the victim of the intrigues and petty jealousies of his times, and while for this his own indiscretions may justly be blamed, the duty is none the less incumbent on the present generation to render due homage to one who is a brave soldier and a devoted, disinterested, self-sacrificing patriot. ”

“ It takes a brave man on the bench to stand firmly for his convictions in the face of such tactics as were adopted by the Terrys. The scene was expected also to have its effect upon the minds of the judges of the Supreme Court of the State, who then were yet to pass finally upon Sullivan's judgment on the appeal from the order denying a new trial. ”

“ The trial judge also noted that this lack of 'malice' would require a verdict for the Associated Press if New York Times were applicable. But he rejected its applicability since there were 'no compelling reasons of public policy requiring additional defenses to suits for libel. Truth alone should be an adequate defense.'
Both sides appealed and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed both the award of compensatory damages and the striking of punitive damages. It stated without elaboration that New York Times was inapplicable. ”

“ Second, by adopting the district court's rationale that an author's bias is strong evidence of his lack of constitutional actual malice, a legal theory contrary to decisions of the Court, other circuits, and state supreme courts, the court of appeals encourages irresponsible journalistic jeremiads, rather than the search for truth which lies at the core of the rule of New York Times v. ”

“ No dress shows a man's figure like an evening suit. At the reception given by the New York Bar Association to the Presiding Justice, Noah Davis, and Mr. Justice Van Vorst, on their retirement from the Bench, we saw Justice Miller in such a costume. Of about Sullivan's height, we called the attention of a friend at the time to the uncommon depth of chest and massiveness of make of this great jurist, and to the fact that he was built more like Sullivan than almost any other man we ever saw. ”

“ First, we held that the States could not impose liability without requiring some showing of fault. See id., at 347-348, 94 S.Ct., at 3010-3011 ("This approach . . . recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation") . Second, we held that the States could not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages on less than a showing of New York Times malice. ”

“ It is not the way for federal courts to adjudicate, and to be required to adjudicate, issues that allegedly concern the Nation's vital welfare. The country would be none the worse off were the cases tried quickly, to be sure, but in the customary and properly deliberative manner. The most recent of the material, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already about three years ago, and the Times itself took three months to formulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its public for that period.
The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution. ”

“ Evenly applied to cases involving 'public men'-whether they be 'public officials' or 'public figures'-it will afford the necessary insulation for the fundamental interests which the First Amendment was designed to protect.
I have no difficulty in concluding that No. 150, Associated Press v. Walker, must be reversed since it is in clear conflict with New York Times. The constitutional defenses were properly raised and preserved by the petitioner. The trial judge expressly ruled that no showing of malice in any sense had been made, and he reversed an award of punitive damages for that reason. ”

“ In that case we held that a charge of criminal conduct against an official or a candidate, no matter how remote in time or place, is always 'relevant to his fitness for office' for purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth. Public discussion about the qualifications of a candidate for elective office presents what is probably the strongest possible case for application of the New York Times rule. ”

“ It should not matter whether the extension of Sullivan is effected by the "incremental harm doctrine," the "subsidiary meaning doctrine," the "libel-proof plaintiff doctrine," or some other invention of the court of appeals. Under Masson, all such efforts are matters of state law. Intentional falsehoods made with actual malice may be held nonactionable by the states (although no state has done so) . There is, however, no federal common law of libel; federal judges lack the power to expand the qualified Sullivan privilege to statements made with actual malice. ”

“ The resolution of the uncertainty in this area of libel actions requires, at bottom, some further exploration and clarification of the reat ionship between libel law and the freedom of speech and press, lest the New York Times rule become a talisman which gives the press constitutionally adequate protection only in a limited field, or, what would be equally unfortunate, one which goes far to immunize the press from having to make just reparation for the infliction of needless injury upon honor and reputation through false publication. ”

“ Gov. Frederick Smythe said: “Wherever the rights of man are recognized, and so long as government by the people shall endure, the name of John Sullivan must be one of the imperishable, of those who were not born to die.”
Col. Daniel Hall said: “Sullivan is worthy of lasting commemoration as one of the most serviceable of the men it was New Hampshire’s great honor to contribute to the cause of American Independence.”
Secretary of State Stearns wrote: “Sullivan was a born leader of men, and preëminently a man for Revolutionary times. ”