Supreme Court of the United States

“ That statutory choice undergirds how the HCE rule works. The rule spells out when higher-income employees like Hewitt are exempt from the FLSA ( because they are “bona fide executive [s] ”) ; but so too, it establishes when those workers are covered (because they are not) . In thus carving up the class of higher-income workers, the salary-basis requirement is hardly unique. Another provision of the HCE rule states, for example, that various workers in “maintenance, construction and similar occupations” are never exempt as executives, “no matter how highly paid they might be.” ”

“ Some nurses working on a per-day or per-shift basis are likely to meet the general rule’s duties test; and their employers would assure them $455 per week in a heartbeat if doing so eliminated the need to pay overtime. And nurses, in the Government’s view, are not alone: They “are just one of the many examples” of workers paid less than $100,000 a year who would, if Helix prevailed, lose their entitlement to overtime compensation. ”

“ Most simply put, an employee paid on an hourly basis is paid by the hour, an employee paid on a daily basis is paid by the day, and an employee paid on a weekly basis is paid by the week—irrespective of when or how often his employer actually doles out the money. ”

“ As Helix notes, the HCE rule is “streamlined” as compared to the one for lower-income workers. See id., at 12, 29. But the HCE rule’s text makes clear what it is streamlined with respect to. Not salary basis, which (as just shown) is described identically for higher- and lower-income workers. Nor salary level, which is set at $455 per week for both groups. Rather, the difference is with respect to workplace duties. As noted above, lower-income employees cannot qualify as bona fide executives unless (1) their primary job is management; (2) they regularly direct the work of others ”

“ In other words, we agreed to decide which regulations certain well-paid employees must satisfy to fit within the overtime-pay exemption. Must they satisfy only §541.601? Or must they satisfy §541.601 and §541.604? ”

“ Indeed, it is Helix’s own position that, if injected into that plan, would produce troubling outcomes—because it would deny overtime pay even to daily-rate employees making far less money than Hewitt.
Initially, Helix’s complaint about “windfalls” for high earners fails in view of what this Court has observed about the FLSA: Workers are not “deprived of the benefits of the Act simply because they are well paid.” ”

“ Webster’s New International Dictionary 2203 (2d ed. 1949) ; see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2003 (2002) (similar) . “Salary” was thus “often distinguished from wages,” which denoted “ [p] ay given for labor” at “short stated intervals.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, at 2203, 2863. As the Court of Appeals put the point, the “concept of ‘salary’ ” is linked, “ [a] s a matter of common parlance,” to “the stability and security of a regular weekly, monthly, or annual pay structure.” ”

“ It contends those regulations are inconsistent with and unsustainable under the terms of the statute on which they are purportedly based. While §541.601, §541.602, and §541.604 focus on an employee’s salary, Helix Energy submits, the statute requires attention to the employee’s duties. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–38, 46–47; Brief for Petitioners 41–44; Reply Brief for Petitioners 20–24; see generally 29 U. S. C. §213 (a) (1) . Understandably, the Court refuses to entertain this larger statutory argument because Helix Energy failed to raise it earlier in the litigation. ”

“ Such “daily-rate” workers, the court continued, can qualify as salaried only through the “special rule” of §604 (b) . Ibid. But Hewitt’s compensation did not satisfy §604 (b) ’s conditions; indeed, the court noted, “Helix does not even purport” to have met them. Id., at 292. The court thus concluded that Hewitt, although highly paid, was not exempt from the FLSA. Six judges dissented in two opinions. The more expansive dissent argued that Hewitt’s compensation “satisfied the salary basis test” of §602 (a) . ”

“ We do not know why the dissent calls that analysis an “alternative rationale.” Post, at 2. It is simply a structural argument in support of a more narrowly focused textual one. Here, text and structure go together in refuting the dissent’s view. ”

“ In these circumstances, I would not reach out to address the operation of §541.602—a question we never granted certiorari to decide, one on which we have received little briefing, and one Helix Energy even assured us we need not decide.
Another reason counsels hesitation, too. Helix Energy does not just dispute the proper application of various regulations. ”

“ Hewitt was not.
C
Our reading of the relevant regulations, as laid out above, properly concludes this case. Helix urges us to consider the policy consequences of that reading, labeling them “far-reaching” and “deleterious.” Reply Brief 24. In Helix’s view, holding that §602 (a) ’s salary-basis test never captures daily-rate workers will give “windfalls” to high earners, disrupt and “increase costs” of industry operations, and “impos [e] significant retroactive liability.” ”