United States federal court system

“ Congress may impose ancillary recordkeeping requirements related to state-court proceedings without violating the Tenth Amendment. Such requirements do not offload the Federal Government’s responsibilities onto the States, nor do they put state legislatures and executives “under the direct control of Congress.” Murphy, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) . Rather, they are a logical consequence of our system of “dual sovereignty” in which state courts are required to apply federal law. ”

“ The judiciary of every government must judge of its own jurisdiction. The federal judiciary and the State judiciary may each determine that it has, or that it has not, jurisdiction of the case brought before it: but neither can withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of the other. The question, whether a State Court has jurisdiction or not, is a judicial question, to be settled by the State judiciary, and not by an act of Congress, nor by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States. Shall the States be denied the power of judging of their own laws? ”

“ The command of the federal Rules is in no way affected by anything that happens in a state court. They are designed as standards for federal agents. The fact that their violation may be condoned by state practice has no relevancy to our problem. Federal courts sit to enforce federal law; and federal law extends to the process issuing from those courts. The obligation of the federal agent is to obey the Rules. They are drawn for innocent and guilty alike. They prescribe standards for law enforcement. ”

“ In short, subject to only one limitation, each State of the Union may establish its own judicature, distribute judicial power among the courts of its choice, define the conditions for the exercise of their jurisdiction and the modes of their proceeding, to the same extent as Congress is empowered to establish a system of inferior federal courts within the limits of federal judicial power, and the States are as free from control by Congress in establishing state systems for litigation as is Congress free from state control in establishing a federal system for litigation. ”

“ A claim based on a federal statute invokes the federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts. But since most of the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain occurred prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed prior to the Civil War, section 1982 does not provide a sturdy basis for the retention of federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' nonfederal claims. A frivolous federal law claim cannot successfully invoke federal jurisdiction. ”

“ In every case a point is reached where litigation must cease; and what that point is can best be determined by the State legislature. The power to render a final judgment must be lodged somewhere; and there is no provision in the Federal Constitution which forbids a State from granting to a tribunal, whether called a court or an administrative board, the final determination of a legal question. Neither in administrative nor judicial proceedings does the due process clause require that the participants be entitled as of right to rehearings, new trials, or appeals. ”

“ If the remand order were eventually reversed, there might finally be a trial in the federal court, also months or years after the original charge was brought.
We have no doubt that Congress, if it chose, could provide for exactly such a system. We may assume that Congress has constitutional power to provide that all federal issues be tried in the federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the States, or that jurisdiction of such issues be shared. ”

“ The Federalist has remarked, that the reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases, in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause, in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts, as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies between different states and their citizens. ”

“ A choice of jurisdictions has been ever esteemed a valuable right, even where there are both of the same kind. The purpose of extending so far the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, is to give every assurance to the general government, of a faithful execution of its laws, and to give citizens, states, and foreigners, an assurance of the impartial administration of justice. Without the salutary institution, the federal government might frequently be obstructed, and its servants want protection. ”

“ Nevertheless, we believe that Article III's limits on federal jurisdiction are designed not only to prevent federal courts from assessing the merits of certain disputes, but also to prevent federal courts from interfering-through such assessments or otherwise-with the jurisdiction of state courts over certain cases, such as this one, that do not implicate federal interests. ”

“ Most prominent jurisdiction-stripping proposals today would shield specific, substantively defined issues, legislation, or policies from judicial review by the Supreme Court, by all federal courts, or by all federal and state courts. The goals of such proposals are overwhelmingly substantive in nature—to protect the particular laws in question from judicial invalidation. Nevertheless, proposals to curb judicial jurisdiction can also have more abstract goals, involving the redistribution of decisionmaking authority within our scheme of government. ”

“ This is what a win looks like under Thunder Basin. When you replace clear jurisdictional rules with a jumble of factors, the room for disagreement grows. The incentive to litigate increases. Years and fortunes are lost just figuring out where a case belongs. Ms. Cochran and Axon have already endured multi-year odysseys through the entire federal judicial system—and no judge yet has breathed a word about the merits of their claims. Nor can I fault the district court in Ms. Cochran’s case, or all of the lower courts in Axon’s case, for thinking the Thunder Basin factors required dismissal. ”

“ Our only duty is to determine the scope of the jurisdictional grant, and we must bow to congressional determination of whether federal adjudication of local issues does more good than harm. But, in resolving the immediate issue, we should not blink the fact that, whatever the need for federal jurisdiction over suits between litigant citizens of the several states, the same need equally compels the safeguards of federal trial for suits brought by citizens of the District of Columbia against citizens of the several states. ”

“ Congress may avail itself of state courts for the enforcement of federal rights, but it must take the state courts as it finds them, subject to all the conditions for litigation in the state courts that the State has decreed for every other litigant who seeks access to its courts. ”

“ Admittedly, it would be easier for States to bring § 5 actions in the district courts in their own States However, the State has sufficient resources to prosecute the actions easily in the Nation's Capital; and, Congress has power to regulate which federal court shall hear suits against the Federal Government. On the other hand, the individual litigant will often not have sufficient resources to maintain an action easily outside the district in which he resides, especially in cases where the individual litigant is attacking a local city or county regulation. ”

“ Whatever a court may say in an opinion does no more to compel federal officials to change how they exercise their prosecutorial discretion than an order vacating the Guidelines. Nor do we measure redressability by asking whether a court’s legal reasoning may inspire or shame others into acting differently. We measure redressability by asking whether a court’s judgment will remedy the plaintiff’s harms. ”