“ SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;—not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? ”
Plato
Summary
Plato’s Meno, a Socratic dialogue composed around 385 BCE but set in 402 BCE, examines the essence of virtue and the question of whether it can be taught, through a dialectical conversation between Socrates and Meno, a Thessalian aristocrat. The text investigates the difficulties of defining virtue, challenges Meno’s paradox—that one cannot search for what one does not understand—and presents Socrates’ theory of recollection (anamnesis), illustrated through a geometric demonstration with Meno’s slave.
Key themes include the relationship between knowledge, genuine belief, and the boundaries of inquiry, leading to a differentiation between knowledge as a firm, teachable concept and simple true belief. The dialogue also considers the role of teachers and the enigmatic character of virtue itself, portraying the quest for wisdom as a fundamental human pursuit.
Quotes from Meno (Plato)
“ SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. MENO: That is probably true, Socrates. SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say. ”
“ But the objection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in the words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. ”
