Korean Air

“ THE WITNESS: Since the accident KCAB has said that the destination airport is not varied enough and the types of approaches are not varied enough.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Are there training scenarios where a pilot is expecting a -- a full ILS but there is a diversion to a -- an airport with a non-precision approach that is not a standard Korean Air destination? ”

“ Do you have knowledge of how many approaches in normal line operations at Korean Air are non-precision approaches?
THE WITNESS: At the home base of -- of Seoul Kimpo Airport we always use -- I correct that statement. We often use non-precision approaches. At domestic airports of -- in particular Chachu (ph) Airport we also use the non-precision approaches. The 747 Classic has many destination airports in Southeast Asia or Middle Eastern countries. In these areas it's quite often we see non-precision approaches. ”

“ At 500 feet, since this airplane had auto-call, the GPWS called 500 feet. Is there a policy for a practice at Korean Air for the flight crew to execute a go-around when executing a non-precision approach and receiving that GPWS call? ”

“ THE WITNESS: If we just take the data as we have today that they strayed from our Korean Air standard procedures.
MR. FEITH: I have no further questions.
MR. CARISEO: No questions, Mr. Chairman.
MR. BERMAN: Captain Park, if these pilots were going to fly a constant descent, non-precision approach, how would you expect them to handle the mode control panel altitude selector?
FIRST OFFICER CHUNG: Excuse me. You mean the accident crew or it doesn't matter? ”

“ On August 6, 1997, about 0142 Guam Local Time, a Korean registered Boeing 747-300, operated by Korean Air Company, Ltd., as Korean Air flight 801, crashed about 3 nautical miles southwest of the Guam International Airport in Agana, Guam, while executing the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 6 left. ”

“ A Korean Air instructor pilot testified at the Safety Board's public hearing that the company required the PF to conduct an approach briefing for every approach and that the briefing was to include the division of crewmember duties during the approach procedures. The instructor pilot stated that, if a pilot receives information that a navigational aid, such as a glideslope, was reported to be unreliable or unusable, Korean Air policy requires the pilot not to use that navigational aid to conduct the approach. ”

“ Korean Air stated that its fleet was expected to grow to approximately 175 aircraft by 2005. Korean Air employed approximately 1,600 flight crewmembers at the time of the flight 801 accident. In an interview with Safety Board investigators, Korean Air management personnel stated that pilot recruitment at the company had historically been from the Korean military. However, as the airline grew, the supply of available Korean military pilots could not keep pace with the rapidly increasing demand for pilots at the company. ”

“ THE WITNESS: We have that particular individual go through counseling with a chief pilot. If that should not prove to be a solution we try to usethe un-matching policy among the -- those two or whoever -- among the people involved. Once a person is on an unmatched policy with another individual, the two of them would not fly together until one of them got out of that aircraft type.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Has the Korean Air ever been warned or been in danger of losing Part 129 authorization to operate into the United States or any of its territories? ”

“ Korean Air requires that an airport familiarization tape be viewed if the company or the FAA list that airport as a "special airport." Title 14 CFR Section 121.445 defines special airports as those that require a special airport qualification for pilots-in-command because of "surrounding terrain, obstructions, or complex approach or departure procedures." [89] Guam International Airport was not classified by Korean Air or the FAA as a special airport; thus, the accident flight crew was not required to view this familiarization tape. ”

“ Korean Air flight 801 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight that departed Kimpo Airport, in Seoul Korea, at 2153. The flight proceeded uneventfully en route to Guam. An audio examination of the CVR revealed that the captain was the "flying pilot" and the First Officer (F/O) was performing the radio communications and non-flying pilot duties at the time of the accident. ”

“ The first officer received familiarization training for operations into Guam on July 8' 1997, and had previous operating experience in the Boeing 747 in 1995.
The flight engineer was a navigator in the Korean Air Force prior to his employment with Korean Air, May 1979. He had flown as engineer on the Boeing 727, Airbus A-300, and Boeing 747, and had had accumulated approximately 13,000 hours of total flight time, of which over 11,000 was as a civilian flight engineer.
One issue developed during the investigation evolved from the operational status of the glideslope portion of the ILS approach. ”

“ Korean Air, based at Seoul's Kimpo International Airport, operates domestic routes to 16 airports and international routes to 54 airports, including those in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, China, Australia, and Japan.
At the time of the flight 801 accident, Korean Air had a fleet of 116 airplanes: 2 Boeing 747-SPs, 15 Boeing 747-200s, 3 Boeing 747-300s, 26 Boeing 747-400s, 2 Boeing 777s, 5 McDonnell Douglas MD-11s, 14 McDonnell Douglas MD-82s, 10 Airbus A-300s, 2 Airbus A-330s, 25 Airbus A-300-600s, and 12 Fokker F.100s. ”

“ What is Korean Air's goal in requiring an approach briefing? What is the intent? I'll further clarify. Which approach is required to be briefed upon arrival at -- at an airport?
THE WITNESS: Approach briefing is absolutely necessary for the sake of safe landing of an aircraft. In addition, a pilot must have constantly watch out on the weather conditions and the traffic conditions atthe destination airport. In addition, a pilot must also keep it under consideration that in case the situation at the destination airport becomes so bad that wouldn't allow safe landing. ”

“ However, with respect to the accident aircraft, Korean Air Aircraft, when you were issuingapproach clearance you -- Korean Air 801 -- Korean 801 cleared for ILS runway 6-left approach, glide slope unusable. ”

“ The foreign government civil aviation authorities of whatever country we're talking of.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Just backtracking a little, when you were providing oversight at the time of the accident for Korean Air and all of the other carriers, how many airplanes normally were -- would you estimate that that included at that time?
THE WITNESS: You mean how many aircraft? That's -- my airlines have?
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I have no idea. It's quite a few.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Okay. Do you have any oversight responsibility regarding ground and flight training at all with foreign carriers? ”

“ Captain Lee, what is Korean Air policy regarding a pilot following a navigational indication that has been reported inoperative or unusable? How should a pilot regard a glide slope indication that may appear normal to him but has been reported unusable or inoperative? ”

“ The Korean Air Boeing 747 Guidebook states that the "descent checklist" is to be performed while the airplane is descending through 20,000 feet to approximately 18,000 feet (or 1,000 feet above transition level in North America) . The guidebook also states that the "approach checklist" is to be performed after a speed reduction to 250 knots and while the airplane is descending through 10,000 feet with its inboard landing lights on and that the "landing checklist" is to be performed when the airplane has been configured for landing. ”

“ The captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance and contributed to his failure to properly execute the approach.
16. Korean Air's training in the execution of nonprecision approaches was ineffective, which contributed to the deficient performance of the flight crew.
17. U.S. air carrier pilots would benefit from additional training and practice in nonprecision approaches during line operations (in daytime visual conditions in which such a practice would not add a risk factor) . ”

“ Captain Lee, in non-precision approaches, is it Korean Air policy to use step-downs or a constant descent for the approach?
THE WITNESS: Basically, we are teaching them to use a step-down method. But when the weather condition is BMC and also pilot -- when pilot select the medial -- medium altimeters -- altitude and also in the condition that he or she will maintain the above the altitude he might choose the constant lower-down for the passengers' sakes. But what we emphasize is he must maintain the -- the chart-depicted altitude. ”

“ The following organizations were given party status and provided technical assistance to the Board: the Federal Aviation Administration; Korean Air Company, Limited; Boeing Commercial Airplane Company; Pratt-Whitney Engines; the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; the United States Navy; and emergency response personnel from Guam.
In addition, Mr. Ham of the Korean Civil Aviation Bureau was designated as the accredited representative and the leader of the Korean delegation in accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. ”

“ The Airclaims Limited database is recognized by the aviation industry as a definitive source for worldwide aviation accident information. Loss data for this comparison were retrieved from Airclaims Client Aviation System Enquiry database and were current as of August 10, 1999. Exposure data were retrieved from Airclaims Limited, Jet Operator Statistics, 1999, issue 1. ↑ Some of these accidents occurred when Korean Air was known as Korean Airlines. For consistency, Korean Air is used throughout this section. ”

“ Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require principal operations inspectors (POI) assigned to U.S. air carriers to ensure that air carrier pilots conduct a full briefing for the instrument approach (if available) intended to back up a visual approach conducted at night or when IMC may be encountered. The Safety Board notes that, although Guam was not a designated special airport requiring special training or familiarization by flight crews, Korean Air encouraged its flight crews to view the airport familiarization video. ”

“ The Korean Air Director of Academic Flight Training stated that the company instituted a CRM training program in December 1986 as a result of the Korean Air shoot down accident in August 1983 off the coast of the Soviet Union. The director stated that the CRM sessions are not graded and that no program records are kept. Pilots are evaluated on CRM during route checks and proficiency check rides. In addition, pilots receive LOFT [85] during simulator sessions once a year and are evaluated based on how they interact in coping with various anomalies during the simulated flight. ”

“ In addition to this, the Safety Board will also be examining several other issues, including the crew's training at Korean Airlines, crew resource management or how the crew works together, and instrument approach procedures and charting. Is therea way to look at these approach procedures that the crew must follow during periods of -- of bad weather or reduced visibility that will give them better information so that we will not have what the chairman has talked about, and that is controlled-flight-into-terrain type accidents. ”

“ The crew did not talk about it from what was on the CVR, and there, from my point of view in reading the CVR, did not appear to be any reaction to those call-outs. Is there a procedure or a policy at Korean Air that would require the crew to either identify those call-outs and/or react to those call-outs?
THE WITNESS: First, why the CVR has those --why the CVR recorded what we hear I don't -- I can't imagine why this happened. Yeah, we teach this during instrument flight rules education. All simulator training and procedures teach immediate responses to minimum GPWS call-outs. ”

“ THE WITNESS: No, sir. We do not.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Are they required or why didn't you receive them --
THE WITNESS: No, sir. They -- we're --we're -- they're not required to submit copies of their manuals to us. The only exception to that would be if the airline was operating a U.S.-registered aircraft. Then the FAA has to improve the maintenance program and the MEL for that aircraft.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: The -- is it required or -- that you send reports of your inspection activities concerning Korean Air to the KCAB?
THE WITNESS: No, sir. There is no requirement. ”

“ The paragraph also states that the inspections should include the following items: aircraft markings; airworthiness, registration, and crewmember certificates; air traffic compliance; taxi and ramp and passenger enplaning/deplaning procedures; baggage and cargo (especially hazardous cargo) ; and compliance with the pilot-in-command age 60 policy, which states that a flight crewmember is prohibited from acting as pilot-in-command if he or she has reached age 60.
According to the FAA, the only "R" item required for Korean Air is one annual ramp inspection. ”

“ Do you consider this statement maycondition a pilot to -- to expect a visual approach in all circumstances?
THE WITNESS: I -- we -- I do not feel this way. The reason we teach all pilots at Korean Air that instrument -- flight instrument approaches are safer and perhaps less -- as easier to perform than the visual approach so that even if approach clearance would give us a visual clearance we would ask -- go back and ask for an instrument approach clearance and try to fly that.
CAPTAIN MISENCIK: Captain Park, how do you consider the 801 accident in the context of CFIT? ”