George Edward Moore

“ That a whole which includes a cognition of something evil or ugly may yet be a great positive good on the whole: most virtues, which have any intrinsic value whatever, seem to be of this kind, e.g. (a) courage and compassion, and (b) moral goodness; all these are instances of the hatred or contempt of what is evil or ugly; 216 132.
but there seems no reason to think that, where the evil object exists, the total state of things is ever positively good on the whole, although the existence of the evil may add to its value as a whole. ”

“ In this way, then, it may be possible to prove the general utility, for the present, of those actions, which in our society are both generally recognized as duties and generally practised; but it seems very doubtful whether a conclusive case can be established for any proposed change in social custom, without an independent investigation of what things are good or bad in themselves. ”

“ It is plain that we cannot hope to prove which among all the actions, which it is possible for us to perform on every occasion, will produce the best total results: to discover what is our 'duty,' in this strict sense, is impossible. ”

“ The relation which ethical judgments assert to hold universally between 'goodness' and other things are of two kinds: a thing may be asserted either to be good itself or to be causally related to something else which is itself good—to be 'good as a means.' 21 16. ”

“ One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between the proposition 'This is good,' when it means 'This existing thing is good,' and the same proposition, when it means 'The existence of this kind of thing would be good'; 118 71.
and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between that which suggests a truth, or is a cause of our knowing it, and that upon which it logically depends, or which is a reason for believing it: in the former sense fiction has a more important bearing on Ethics than Metaphysics can have. ”

“ It follows from what has been said that we have every reason to suppose that a cognition of material qualities, and even their existence, is an essential constituent of the Ideal or Summum Bonum: there is only a bare possibility that they are not included in it. ”

“ Finally (4) with regard to the objects of the cognition which is essential to these good wholes, it is the business of Aesthetics to analyse their nature: it need only be here remarked (1) that, by calling them 'beautiful,' we mean that they have this relation to a good whole; and (2) that they are, for the most part, themselves complex wholes, such that the admiring contemplation of the whole greatly exceeds in value the sum of the values of the admiring contemplation of the parts. ”

“ The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely due to a confusion between the cause and the object of desire: pleasure is certainly not the sole object of desire, and, even if it is always among the causes of desire, that fact would not tempt anyone to think it a good. 68 43.
Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to happiness is 'a part' of happiness. ”

“ The distinction between 'duty' and 'interest' is also, in the main, the same non-ethical distinction; but the term 'interested' does also refer to a distinct ethical predicate—that an action is to 'my interest' asserts only that it will have the best possible effects of one particular kind, not that its total effects will be the best possible. ”

“ Three possible views as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is proposed to confine the name 'Evolutionistic Ethics.' On any of these three views the relation would be unimportant, and the 'Evolutionistic' view, which makes it important, involves a double fallacy. ”

“ Christian moralists are right in implying that mere 'external rightness' has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it is therefore not 'virtuous,' since this implies that it has no value as a means: 175 107.
(b) where virtue consists in a disposition to have, and be moved by, a sentiment of love towards really good consequences of an action and of hatred towards really evil ones, it has some intrinsic value, but its value may vary greatly in degree: 177 108. ”

“ With regard to II. Personal Affection, the object is here not merely beautiful but also good in itself; it appears, however, that the appreciation of what is thus good in itself, viz. the mental qualities of a person, is certainly, by itself, not so great a good as the whole formed by the combination with it of an appreciation of corporeal beauty ”

“ Hence (1) no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal, (2) the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it, and (3) where evils already exist, the existence of mixed virtues has a value independent both of its consequences and of the value which it has in common with the proper appreciation of imaginary evils. ”

“ The term 'metaphysical' is defined as having reference primarily to any object of knowledge which is not a part of Nature—does not exist in time, as an object of perception; but since metaphysicians, not content with pointing out the truth about such entities, have always supposed that what does not exist in Nature, must, at least, exist, the term also has reference to a supposed 'supersensible reality': 110 67. ”

“ But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics, is not that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon the question involved in practical Ethics 'What effects will my action produce?,' but that it has such a bearing upon the fundamental ethical question, 'What is good in itself?.' This theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy ”

“ I think that this question should be answered in the affirmative; but in order to ensure that this judgment is correct, we must carefully distinguish it 194 118.
from the two judgments (a) that knowledge is valuable as a means, (b) that, where the object of the cognition is itself a good thing, its existence, of course, adds to the value of the whole state of things: 195 119.
if, however, we attempt to avoid being biased by these two facts, it still seems that mere true belief may be a condition essential to great value. ”

“ Darwin's scientific theory of 'natural selection,' which has mainly caused the modern vogue of the term 'Evolution,' must be carefully distinguished from certain ideas which are commonly associated with the latter term. ”

“ In order to obtain a correct answer to the question 'What is good in itself?' we must consider what value things would have if they existed absolutely by themselves; 187 113.
and, if we use this method, it is obvious that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest goods with which we are acquainted. ”

“ I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. 95 C. 58.
It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism. It is important to distinguish the former, as the doctrine that 'my own pleasure is sole good,' from the doctrine, opposed to Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure exclusively is right as a means. 96 59.
Egoism proper is utterly untenable, being self-contradictory ”