Supreme Court of Arizona

“ We held that they do. “Much that is urged in argument with regard to the meaning of the term ‘Legislature,’ ” we explained, “is beside the point.” Ibid. And we concluded in straightforward terms that legislatures must abide by “restriction [s] imposed by state constitutions ... when exercising the lawmaking power” under the Elections Clause. Id., at 369. Arizona State Legislature said much the same, emphasizing that, by its text, nothing in the Elections Clause offers state legislatures carte blanche to act “in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.” ”

“ As to the “power that makes laws” in Arizona, initia­tives adopted by the voters legislate for the State just as measures passed by the representative body do. See Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 1, §1 (“The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, but the people reserve the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such laws and amend­ments at the polls, independently of the legislature.”) ”

“ Absent congressional authorization, does the Elections Clause preclude the people of Arizona from creating a commission operating independently of the state legislature to establish congres­sional districts? The history and purpose of the Clause weigh heavily against such preclusion, as does the animat­ing principle of our Constitution that the people them­selves are the originating source of all the powers of government. ”

“ But the Clause surely was not adopted to di­minish a State’s authority to determine its own lawmak­ing processes. Article I, §4, stems from a different view. Both parts of the Elections Clause are in line with the fundamental premise that all political power flows from the people. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404–405 (1819) . So comprehended, the Clause doubly empow­ers the people. They may control the State’s lawmaking processes in the first instance, as Arizona voters have done, and they may seek Congress’ correction of regula­tions prescribed by state legislatures. ”

“ The majority largely ignores this evidence, relying instead on disconnected observations about direct democracy, a contorted interpretation of an irrelevant statute, and naked appeals to public policy. Nowhere does the majority explain how a constitutional provision that vests redistricting authority in “the Legislature” permits a State to wholly exclude “the Legislature” from redistricting. Arizona’s Commission might be a noble endeavor—although it does not seem so “independent” in practice—but the “fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful ... ”

“ The majority also points to a scattered array of election-related laws and constitutional provisions enacted via popular lawmaking that it claims would be “endangered” by interpreting the Elections Clause to mean what it says. Ante, at 33. Reviewing the constitutionality of these far-flung provisions is well outside the scope of this case. Suffice it to say that none of them purports to do what the Arizona Constitution does here: set up an unelected, unaccountable institution that permanently and totally displaces the legislature from the redistricting process. “ [T] his wolf comes as a wolf.” ”

“ The Supreme Court of the state of Arizona sustained, against objections raised by plaintiffs in error under the 'due process of law' and 'equal protection' clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, a statutory provision found in paragraph 1464, Arizona Civil Code 1913, which restricts the employment of the process of injunction against what are called peaceful picketing and boycotting under certain circumstances, in terms similar to those found in section 20 of the Clayton Act of Congress (Act Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 738 [Comp. St. § 1243d] ) . ”

“ Can you honestly tell Americans, with a pending Supreme Court case over legal observers not being able to observe and inspect signatures, that the laws and Constitution of Arizona were not violated to change voting outcomes? ”

“ On recommendation of the commission on judicial conduct, or on its own motion, the supreme court may suspend a judge from office without salary when, in the United States, he pleads guilty or no contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under Arizona or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral turpitude under such law. ”

“ Similarly, when a State attempts to make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution. ”

“ We hold, first, that the Arizona Legislature, having lost authority to draw congressional districts, has standing to contest the constitutionality of Proposition 106. Next, we hold that lawmaking power in Arizona includes the initiative process, and that both §2a (c) and the Elections Clause permit use of the AIRC in congressional districting in the same way the Commission is used in districting for Arizona’s own Legislature. ”

“ None of those measures permit the state legislatures to override the people’s pre­scriptions. The Arizona Legislature’s theory—that the lead role in regulating federal elections cannot be wrested from “the Legislature,” and vested in commissions initiated by the people—would endanger all of them.
The list of endangered state elections laws, were we to sustain the position of the Arizona Legislature, would not stop with popular initiatives. Almost all state constitu­tions were adopted by conventions and ratified by voters at the ballot box, without involvement or approval by “the Legislature.” ”

“ Proposition 106, in his view, unconstitutionally denied “the Legislature” of Arizona the “ability to have any outcome-defining effect on the congressional redistricting process.” Id., at 1058.
We postponed jurisdiction, and now affirm.
II
We turn first to the threshold question: Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit? Trained on “whether the plaintiff is [a] proper party to bring [a particular lawsuit,] ” standing is “ [o] ne element” of the Constitution’s case-or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority, expressed in Article III of the Constitu­tion. ”

“ Turning the coin, the legislature’s responsiveness to the people its members represent is hardly heightened when the representative body can be confident that what it does will not be over­ turned or modified by the voters themselves. *** Invoking the Elections Clause, the Arizona Legislature instituted this lawsuit to disempower the State’s voters from serving as the legislative power for redistricting purposes. ”

“ Although the dissent seems unwilling to accept the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the statute as expressive of the Act's primary purpose [11] and indeed characterizes that construction as unfortunate, post, at 667, a reading of the provisions outlined above leaves the impression that the Arizona Court's description of the statutory purpose is not only logical but persuasive. The sole emphasis in the Act is one of providing leverage for the collection of damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or are adjudged negligent. ”

“ This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smiley in a case considering the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative. Voters “amended Arizona’s Constitution to remove redistricting authority from the Arizona Legislature and vest that authority in an independent commission.” Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 792 (2015) . The Arizona Legislature challenged a congressional map adopted by the commission, arguing that the Elections “Clause precludes resort to an independent commission ... to accomplish redistricting.” ”

“ The cases cited to support this dictum fail to do so; they are merely cases where a determination of unconstitutionality is avoided by applying what there is no reason to believe is anything other than normal standing requirements. It seems to me utterly implausible that the Framers wanted federal courts limited to traditional judicial cases only when they were pronouncing upon the rights of Congress and the President, and not when they were treading upon the powers of state legislatures and executives. ”

“ We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.
VI Appellants urge that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because, as construed by its Supreme Court, "there is no right of appeal [p58] from a juvenile court order. . . ." ”

“ I, §4’s reference to “the Legislature” meant simply the “constituted authorities, through whom [the State] choose [s] to speak,” prime among them, the State’s Constitution, “which rises above ... all legislative action”) . Others anticipated that retaining the reference to “the legislature” would “condem [n] ... any [redistricting] legislation by referendum or by initiative.” 47 Cong. Rec. 3436 (statement of Sen. Burton) . In any event, proponents of the change maintained, “ [i] n view of the very serious evils arising from gerrymanders,” Congress should not “take any chances in [the] matter.” ”

“ Reading today’s opinion, one would think the Court is a great defender of direct democracy in the States. As it reads “the Legislature” out of the Times, Places and Manner Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, the majority offers a paean to the ballot initiative. It speaks in glowing terms of the “characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.” Ante, at 27. And it urges “ [d] eference to state lawmaking” so that States may perform their vital function as “ ‘laboratories’ ” of democracy. ”

“ Put simply, the state legislature need not be exclusive in congressional districting, but neither may it be excluded.
The majority’s contrary understanding requires it to accept a definition of “the Legislature” that contradicts the term’s plain meaning, creates discord with the Seventeenth Amendment and the Constitution’s many other uses of the term, makes nonsense of the drafting and ratification of the Elections Clause, and breaks with the relevant precedents. In short, the effect of the majority’s decision is to erase the words “by the Legislature thereof” from the Elections Clause. ”

“ No matter how vaguely defined an aggravating circumstance is, there will be a finite number of cases in which that circumstance has been applied. It hardly limits the application of that aggravating factor to list those prior decisions, or to provide illustrative examples from among them. I do not see how the Arizona Supreme Court's description of the manner in which a vague aggravating factor has been applied can be regarded as the establishment of a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction. ”

“ As well in Arizona, the people may delegate their legislative authority over redistricting to an inde­pendent commission just as the representative body may choose to do. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16 (answering the Court’s question, may the Arizona Legislature itself estab­lish a commission to attend to redistricting, counsel for appellant responded yes, state legislatures may delegate their authority to a commission, subject to their preroga­tive to reclaim the authority for themselves) . ”

“ May a Federal court sitting in the State of Arizona direct a verdict for the defendant in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, when it appears as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, notwithstanding the state constitutional provision to the contrary?'
Construing the constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company v. ”

“ Canter, is that the court shall be inferior to the supreme court. Its jurisdiction may be made concurrent with that of every other court which is alike inferior to the supreme court. Section 1869 provides for appeals and writs of error from the district courts to the supreme court, but this is not at all inconsistent with authority in the legislature of Arizona to allow like appeals and writs of error from any other inferior court it may establish. ”

“ I am inclined to believe this practice of the American courts to be at once most favorable to liberty and to public order. If the judge could only attack the legislator only openly and directly, he would sometimes be afraid to oppose him ”

“ The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Arizona for further consideration in light of Chambers v. ”

“ He judges the law only because he is obliged to judge a case. The political question that he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interests of the parties, and he cannot refuse to decide it without a denial of justice. ”

“ The Court’s response is not much better. The majority observes that “the Legislature” of a State may perform different functions under different provisions of the Constitution. Under Article I, §3, for example, “the Legislature” performed an “electoral” function by choosing Senators. The “Legislature” plays a “consenting” function under Article I, §8, and Article IV, §3; a “ratifying” function under Article V; and a “lawmaking” function under the Elections Clause. ”